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Oppress the Employee: Louisiana's Approach to
Noncompetition Agreements*

I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a recent college graduate, Bob, with a degree in Computer Science.'
This student seeks ajob as a salesman with any company that will have him. The
student is worried that he will never be hired because, even though he received
decent grades, he has no prior work experience. After enduring many grueling
interviews, Bob receives an offer to work as a Level One Salesperson for
ComputerSoftwareCompany.Com. The hiring partner informs him of his salary,
his benefits, and what is generally expected ofhim. The partner tells him that the
company will provide all of the training concerning how to sell the products.
ComputerSoftwareCompany.Com has a number of major clients for whom they
develop new software to meet their changing needs, and part of Bob's job
includes contacting these customers regularly and informing them about new
products. Bob is so excited about the job he has been offered that he immediately
accepts.
The partner then presents Bob with a standard employment contract. The
contract states that Bob is being hired as an employee-at-will. The contract
includes a noncompetition agreement that prohibits Bob, upon termination of his
employment with ComputerSoftwareCompany.Com, from working for any
competitor of ComputerSoftwareCompany.Com in any capacity whatsoever for
a period of two years from the termination of employment in all of the listed
parishes. The agreement lists every single parish of Louisiana, even though
ComputerSoftwareCopany.Com only has clients in East Baton Rouge,
Ascension, Saint Charles, Saint James, and Orleans parishes. Bob signs the
employment contract thinking that noncompetition agreements are never enforced
against entry level employees.
Bob begins work at ComputerSoftwareCompany.Com. His first day goes
well: he meets his co-employees, fills out more paperwork, sets up his cubicle, and
learns all the passwords to access his desktop. He learns nothing about
ComputerSoftwareCompany.Com's customers or products. On day two, the firing
partner visits Bob with some news. The company is not doing well financially and
has to make some cutbacks. Unfortunately for Bob, this means him-he is
terminated. Dejected, Bob packs up his cubicle and heads home, but not before
picking up a classified section of the newspaper.
Copyright 2001, by LOUISIANA LAw REvIEw
*

As this comment goes to press, the Louisiana Supreme Court has handed down its decision

in Swat 24 Shreveport Bossier,Inc. v.Bond, 2001 WL 754754 (La. 6/29/01). Although that decision
resolved certain conflicts in the circuit courts of appeal which are discussed in this comment, readers
may find the comment useful in that it provides a comprehensive review of the law ofnoncompetition
agreements up until the Swat 24 decision.
1. All names and companies in this hypothetical are fictitious.
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Bob notices that SoftwareDeveloper.Com is hiring. He interviews with the
company and is hired, in fact, under the same terms as
ConiputerSoftwareCompany.Com had hired him. Bob calls a friend who still works at
ComputerSoftware.Com to tell him the good news that he has been hired so quickly.
Unfortunately for Bob, his friend informs management at
ComputerSoftwareCompany.Com about Bob's new job.
Bob is served the next day with a temporary restraining order, which informs him
that ConiputerSoftwareCompany.Com plans to enforce the noncompetition agreement
he had signed. Bob is outraged! Why should he be prevented from getting a new job
in all ofLouisiana when he was fired after receiving little or no training? Furthermore,
why should he be restricted from working for two entire years? Bob decides to fight this
in court, sure that no reasonable court would enforce such an agreement against him.
Bob is greatly surprised when the court enforces the agreement against him. While
the court limits the agreement to East Baton Rouge, Ascension, Saint Charles, Saint
James, and Orleans Parishes, this is of little consolation to Bob, because
SoftwareDeveloper.Com is located in and does business in the same parishes.
Although the result reached by the court seems harsh, it is the result that would most
likely be reached by some Louisiana courts today. Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:92 12

2. La. RS. 23:921 (Supp. 2001). The full text ofthe statute covers restraints oftrade with respect
to the sale of goodwill, noncompetition agreements, partnerships, franchise agreements, and computer
program design. For purposes of this article, only sections A, C,and Gare of import. The full text of
these sections provides:
§ 921. Restraint ofbusiness prohibited; restraint on forum prohibited; competing business;
contracts against engaging in; provisions for
A. (1)Every contract or agreement, or provision thereof, by which anyone is restrained from
exercising a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind, except as provided in this
Section, shall be null and void.
C. Any person, including a corporation and the individual shareholders of such corporation,
who is employed as an agent, servant, or employee may agree with his employer to refrain
from carrying on or engaging in a business similar to that of the employer and/or from
soliciting customers of the employer within a specified parish or parishes, municipality or
municipalities, or parts thereof, so long as the employer carries on a like business therein,
not to exceed a period of two years from termination of employment. An independent
contractor, whose work is performed pursuant to a written contract, may enter into an
agreement to refrain from carrying on or engaging in a business similar to the business of the
person'with whom the independent contractor has contracted, on the same basis as if the
independent contractor were an employee, for a period not to exceed two years from the date
of the last work performed under the written contract.
G. Any agreement covered by Subsections B, C, D, E, or F of this Section shall be
considered an obligation not to do, and failure to perform may entitle the obligee to recover
damages for the loss sustained and the profit of which he has been deprived. In addition,
upon proof of the obligor's failure to perform, and without the necessity of proving
irreparable injury, a court ofcompetent jurisdiction shall order injunctive relief enforcing the
terms of the agreement.
La. M.S.
23:921.263
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governs noncompetition agreements, and courts simply require mechanical adherence to
the statute in order to effect an enforceable agreement.

Louisiana courts would not always have reached the same conclusion.
Noncompetition agreements have been prohibited by statute since 1934, and such
agreements have been deemed violations of public policy.3 Despite this traditional
view ofsuch agreements, the Louisiana legislature was persuaded in 1962, and again
in 1989, to amend the statutory provision to allow noncompetition agreements in
limited circumstances. The amendments undoubtedly resulted frommarket pressures

and successful lobbying by businesses, as Louisiana employers were disadvantaged
because they were unable to protect their competitive advantages when employees
chose to terminate employment and began working in direct competition with their
former employers. It was unfair for employees or their new employers to benefit at
the expense offormer employers. The legislature therefore attempted to alleviate this
problem by providing, exceptions to the general prohibition of noncompetition
agreements.5
Unfortunately, the courts have applied the statute inconsistently since its
adoption. Despite drastic inconsistencies, the Louisiana Supreme Court has denied
writs in almost every case. Finally, in the 1997°case of AMCOM v. Battson,6 the
Louisiana Supreme Court arrived at the opportunity to clarify at least one
issue-whether noncompetition agreements maybe reformed. However, the supreme
court simply overruled the appellate court's decision and reinstated the trial court's
opinion, which had reformed an overly broad agreement. Because no reasons were
given, the circuits are again split as to the implications of this decision.
Noncompetition agreements theoretically are invaluable to many types of
employers, such as those who provide customer lists and training to their employees.
As a result, many employers include them in their employment contracts and, of
course, expect them to be enforceable. However, because the courts are inconsistent
in their enforcement of such agreements, the employer cannot know whether the
agreement will provide any benefit. Moreover, employees who sign noncompetition
agreements are sometimes unnecessarily restricted in their post-termination activities.
This article will examine the conflicting policies of noncompetition agreements,
the inconsistent manner in which Louisiana courts have treated them, the problems
which AMCOM v. Battson has created and its implications. The article compares
Louisiana's statute and its application to the statutes ofFlorida and Alabama, the two
statutes upon which the legislature based Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:921. This
3. See 1934 La. Acts 484, ActNo. 133 (currentversion at La. RS. 23:921(Supp. 2001)); see also
La. R.S. 23:921(A) (Supp. 2001).

4. In1962, noncompetition agreements were allowed in the employment setting if the employer
incurred an expense in the training of the employee or in the advertisement of the business. See
Historical and Statutory notes of La. R.S. 23:921 (1998). In 1989, agreements not to compete were
allowed in the sale of goodwill of a business, in employment contracts, and in partnership dissolutions,
ifcertain elements were satisfied. See Historical and Statutory notes ofLa. RIS. 23:921 (1998); La. R.S.
23:921(B-D) (1998).
5. The general prohibition is found in public policy and codified in La. R.S. 23:921(A) (Supp.
2001).
6.

666 So. 2d 1227 (La. App. 2d Cir.), reversed, 670 So. 2d 1223 (1996).
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article considers whether noncompetition agreements are in fact necessary to protect
employers. Finally, this article offers some solutions to the problems that Louisiana
faces with respect to noncompetition agreements.
II. WHY NONCOMPETITION AGREEMENTS ARE GENERALLY DISFAVORED

Although the current trend in Louisiana law is to enforce noncompetition
agreements against employees, such agreements were not always favored. For
example, prior to 1962 any agreement in which an employee agreed not to compete
with his employer after the employment relationship was terminated was
unenforceable." When the Louisiana legislature amended the statute in 1962 to allow
noncompetition agreements in limited circumstances, the Louisiana courts interpreted
the statute so narrowly that no agreement was enforced.' Notably, the current
Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:291 begins with a general prohibition of all
noncompetition agreements.' This general aversion to noncompetition agreements is
rooted in several concerns: the spectre of involuntary servitude, the restriction of
one's ability to breach an inefficient contract, the necessity to issue prohibitory
injunctions, and the lack ofmutuality in such contracts.
A. ConnotationofInvoluntaryServitude
When anemployee cannot leave hisjob, for whatever reason, images ofshackles,
chains, and cruel treatment come to mind. Although indentured servitude once served
an important role,"0 after the American Revolution it came to be associated with
slavery." Indentured servitude was often a means ofperpetuating slavery in the South
through the Black Codes, which, among other things, criminalized as vagrants black
males who did not enter into employment contracts.' Because of this and other
oppressive practices, courts became sensitive to attempts by employers to limit an
employee's future employment options."
In 1911, the United States Supreme Court in Bailey v. Alabama 4 invalidated an
Alabama statute that established a presumption ofcriminal intent to gain money by
false pretenses when an employee breached a labor contract without repaying the
7. La. R.S. 23:921 (1934).
8. See La. R.S. 23:921 (1962); Jeffery D. Morgan, Comment, IfAt First You Don t Succeed:
Louisiana's Latest Statutory Enactment Governing Agreements Not to Compete, 66 Tul. L Rev. 551,
557-58 (1991).

9. La. R.S. 23:921 (Supp. 2001).
10. The role of indentured servitude was to provide immigrants with a means of traveling to
America. Without the promise to work for up to seven years for their masters, immigrants who could
not otherwise finance the voyage would have been unable to emigrate to America. Christopher T.
Wonnell, The Contractual Disempowerment ofEmployees, 46 Stan. L Rev. 87, 120-21 (1993).
11. Id. at 126.
12. Id. at 127.
13. Seeid.
14. Baileyv. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219,31S. Ct. 145(1911).
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monetary advance given by the employer." The Court held that the Thirteenth
Amendment did not permit criminalizing the breach of an employment contract. 6
Because contract labor developed against the backdrop of slavery and forced labor,
the public began to view contract labor as "unconscionable tyranny." 7
Although noncompetition agreements are not contract labor per se, 8 one can see
how a contract that restricts an employee's post-employment activities suggests
oppression, particularly considering that an employer arguably gains more from a
noncompetition agreement than the employee. Furthermore, employees are often in
a weak bargaining position at the time they are presented with noncompetition
agreements. In light ofthis history, skepticism regarding noncompetition agreements
is understandable.
B. Theory ofthe EfficientBreach
The economics theory of efficient breach "suggests that society is better off
permitting resources tied up by contracts to move to the party who most values them
when circumstances change."' 9 Thus, if A, who is bound to a contract with B,
discovers a more profitable deal with C, and the damages for breach of the contract
with B will not be greater than the increase in profits resulting from the contract with
C, the theory ofefficient breach encourages A to breach the contract with B and enter
into a contract with C. The theory suggests that not breaching the contract results in
inefficiency.2" Thus, an employee should be able to change jobs if it is the efficient
thing to do.

Noncompetition agreements discourage the efficient breach when they restrict an
employee from entering into employment with a competitor who may value the
employee's services more. Employers who want to hire away employees subject to
noncompetition agreements may, of course, pay damages on behalf of the new
employee to the first employer to avoid litigation, if the first employer is willing and
if he can translate the damages into an accurate and agreeable dollar figure.2 ' If the
employment contract contains a buyout clause, the new employer may simply pay the

amount stipulated in the contract without fear oflitigation against the employee or the

15. Wonnell, supra note 10, at 127-28 (citing Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 31 S. Ct. 145,
52-53) (1911).
16. Id. at 128 (citing Bailey, 219 U.S. at244-45,31 S.Ct. at 152-53).
17. Id. at 131.
18. Rather, they merely limit the activities of an employee after the employment relationship has
ended.
19. Wonnell, supra note 10, at 100.
20. Id.at 100-01.
21. Litigation for breach ofnoncompetition agreements is generally by a past employer against
his former employee. Because an employee may be unable or unwilling to pay monetary damages, the
new employer may have to pay the damages if he wants to hire the employee. Furthermore, a former
employer may sue a new employer directly for intentional interference with contract, ifthe jurisdiction
recognizes the tort. Louisiana currently recognizes the tort of intentional interference with contract, but
only in limited circumstances. See generally9 to 5 v. Spumey, 538 So. 2d 228 (La. 1989).
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employer; however, buyout clauses are rare.2" The uncertainty of monetary damages
plus litigation costs lends itself to making inefficient what would otherwise be an
efficient breach, thereby restraining trade and competition.
C. Reluctanceto Issue ProhibitoryInjunctions

Noncompetition agreements often require a court-issued injunction prohibiting
the defendant-employee fromworking forthe competitor or otherwise competing with
the former employer. However, courts are generally reluctant to issue prohibitory
injunctions as a remedy for breach of contract claims where no noncompetition
agreement is present, granting them only in exceptional circumstances.23 For
example, courts may issue injunctions in the absence of noncompetition agreements
when the employee's services are unique or extraordinary, thereby making legal
remedies inadequate.24 Some courts have explained that their reluctance to issue
injunctions stems from an aversion to imposing involuntary servitude.25 Moreover,
courts are disinclined to issue injunctions where the employee who breached is readily
replaced in the labor market.26 Some courts refuse to enforce noncompetition
agreements when a prohibitory injunction will be necessary.
D. Lack ofMutuality
Some commentators argue that noncompetition agreements are inappropriate in
an at-will employment relationship because of a lack of consideration and mutuality
of performance.27 Although some courts find continued employment sufficient
consideration for the signing of a noncompetition agreement, it has been argued that
this reasoning is flawed.2 While the employer can still fire the employee, the
22. Buyout clauses are most often used in employmnt contracts with professional athletes and
coaches. An example isthe liquidated damages provision that was contained in Coach Gerry DiNardo's
coaching contract with Vanderbilt. Inthe contract, DiNardo agreed to reimburse Vanderbilt his net
salary multiplied by the number of years remaining on his contract if he left and was employed by
another person or institution prior to the expiration of his contract. Vanderbilt Univ. v. DiNardo, 174
F.3d 751, 753-54 (6th Cir. 1999). Including buyout clauses in every employment contract might
alleviate some ofthe problems with noncompetition agreements, as will be discussed hereinafter.
23. Wonnell, supranote 10, at 93.
24. Id. at 93-94. An injunction isan equitable remedy; equitable remedies come into play only
when legal remedies are inadequate. Id. at 94.
25. Id. at 94. The involuntary servitude arises when the employer isprohibited from competing,
and must therefore return to the employment of the first employer in order to earn asubsistence.
26. Id. at 95.
27. See, e.g. Tracy L Staidl, The EnforceabilityofNoncompetitionAgreementsWhen Employment
isAt-Will: Reformulating the Analysis, 2 Employee Rts. & Employment Pol'y J.95 (1998). Louisiana
does not require consideration to have a binding contract. Rather, it requires the often more easily
satisfied lawful cause to have a legally enforceable obligation. Although cause and consideration are
different, they are generally analogous. For the present purposes ofunderstanding the general reasoning
as to why noncompetition agreements are disfavored, the terms are used interchangeably.
28. Id. at 104. Note that Louisiana courts find continued employment sufficient cause. See, e.g.
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employee no longer has the freedom to leave and to find the same kind ofjob with a
different employer.29 Moreover, after an employee signs a noncompetition agreement,
an employer has a valuable asset in that the employee will be unable to compete,
while the employee has nothing more than possible continued employment.3 ° The
former is a legally enforceable promise while the latter is a legally unenforceable
expectation; thus, no mutuality of performance is present and the consideration is
insufficient. 3
To avoid these problems, some courts have required employment for a reasonable
or substantial period as a precondition to enforcement of the noncompetition
agreement.32 However, this approach does not alleviate the lack of mutuality of
performance, as the employer still has the legally enforceable noncompetition
agreement while the employee has merely a legally unenforceable expectation.3"
Other courts have required that some benefit be bestowed upon the employee for the
noncompetition agreement to be supported by valid consideration.34 The problem
with this approach is that the court must determine whether the benefit was given for
signing the noncompetition agreement or simply to reward the performance ofworkrelated duties." Either case breeds uncertainty as to whether the noncompetition
agreement will be upheld, as the court will make this determination with the benefit
of hindsight.
At least one commentator has suggested that noncompetition agreements should
be prohibited in employment at-will relationships in order to avert the abuse of the
power a noncompetition agreement allows the employer to exercise.36 Instead, such
agreements should only be allowed if an employer gives up his right to terminate the
employee for any reason and agrees not to terminate the employee, except for just
cause.37 In such a situation, the employee would receive more job security in

Cellular One v. Boyd, 653 So. 2d 30, 34 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied 660 So. 2d 449 (1995).
29. Staidl, supra note 27, at 104-05.
30. Id.
31. Id. The mutuality of performance theory has been discredited because one performance may

be the cause ofmultiple promises. See Wiliborn et al., Employment Law Cases and Materials 66-67 (2d
ed. 1998) (citing Clyde W. Summers, The Contract of Employment and the Rights of Individual
Employees: Fair Representation and Employment at Will, 52 Fordharn L. Rev. 1082, 1098-99).

However, the fact that the performances are unequal and the employer is generally in a stronger
bargaining position sheds light on why courts are often hesitant to enforce noncompetition agreements.
32. Staidl, supra note 27, at 105 (citing Zellner v. Conrad, 183 A.D. 2d 250, 589 N.Y.S. 2d 903
(1992).
33. Id. at 106. The employee's promise is unenforceable because the employee does not
automatically have a right to sue his employer for firing him. The employer may fire the employee-atwill for good reason, no reason at all, or even bad reasons, subject to the limits ofcontract and toit law.
Steven L Willbom et al., Employment Law Cases and Materials 47 (2d ed. 1998).
34. Staidl, supranote 27, at 107 (citing Sanborn Mfg. v. Currie, 500 N.W.2d 161 (Minn. Ct. App.
1993)).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 112.
37. Id. at 118. It is understood that employers cannot in practice terminate for any reason. Of
course they cannot terminate for reasons which would violate public policy, such as on grounds of race
or sex.
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exchange for the agreement not to compete after the employment relationship ends.3"
Furthermore, an employee with a just-cause provision in his employment contract
could sue for damages if the employer fired him without just cause, just as the
employer could sue for damages if the employee breached the noncompetition
agreement. Courts might find the enforcement of such noncompetition agreements
to be equitable, and therefore might regularly enforce such agreements, if the
employee also has a legal remedy in the event that the employer breaches the
employment contract by terminating him without just cause. 9 Although such an
approach might alleviate the problem oflack ofmutuality, other problems still remain,
including whether the noncompetition agreement is reasonable under the
circumstances and whether the agreement is so essential to the welfare of the
employer that the resulting restraint ofcompetition is justified.
E. Benefits to Employees
Although noncompetition agreements are often viewed negatively for reasons
discussed above, courts should not always refuse to enforce them. The all out
invalidation of any agreement not to compete would disempower employees by
denying potential employees some bargaining power when contracting for
employment.4" Employees would lose the ability to bargain for favorable terms in
exchange for a promise not to compete if such a promise was not legally
enforceable. 4' Even if an employee did not bargainfor favorable terms, an employer
would arguably be more willing to bestow additional benefits on the employee if he
knew that his investment in the employee would be protected by an enforceable
noncompetition agreement. 2
III. A BRIEF

HISTORY OF LOUISIANA'S LAW ON NONCOMPETITION AGREEMENTS

Before 1934 no law governed noncompetition agreements, and Louisiana courts
generally applied a reasonableness standard to determine whether these agreements
were enforceable.43 If, however, the agreement was one involving an employment
contract, 44 the courts did not employ the reasonableness standard. Instead, the courts
employed a more critical analysis, most often resulting in the nullification of the
38. Id. at 119.
39. See generally Steven L Willboin et al., Employment Law Cases and Materials 67 (2d ed.
1998).
40. Wonnell, supra note 10.
41. Id. at 145. Whether an employee actually has the bargaining power to negotiate favorable
terms is questionable.
42. For example, an employer who knows a noncompetition agreement will be enforced might
provide an employee with employer-financed training or access to customer lists, which would likely
increase the salary of the employee.
43. Morgan, supra note 8, at 553.
44. Other noncompetition agreements included those concerning the sale of a business, and
others.
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agreement.45 Since Louisiana has adopted employment at will, the courts have viewed
such noncompetition agreements as weighing too heavily in the employer's favor, as
only the employee would be bound at the end of the relationship no matter who
severed it. Such agreements therefore lacked consideration."'
In 1934 the Louisiana legislature specifically addressed noncompetition
agreements in passing Act 133, which declared unenforceable any agreement in
which an employee agreed not to compete with his employer after the employment
relationship was terminated. 7 The courts "consistently interpreted the statute as
providing a broad policy against all agreements not to compete that were made an
ancillary to the employment contract."' s
A 1962 amendment lifted the general prohibition ofnoncompetition agreements

in the employment relationship in two circumstances: "where the employer incurs
an expense in the training of the employee or incurs an expense in the advertisement
of the business that the employer is engaged in."' The statute limited the
noncompetition agreement to the same route or territory where the employer engaged
in business, and it limited the maximum period to two years.50 However, the
Louisiana Supreme Court in Orkin ExterminatingCo. v. FotP' added a gloss to the
statute,52 requiring the employer to have incurred substantial expenses for the
The court emphasized the right of
noncompetition agreement to be valid.
individuals to better themselves and stressed that employees have uneven bargaining
power in relation to employers. The court advocated a restrictive interpretation of
the statute. As a result, no court considering the enforceability of noncompetition
agreements after Orkin found there to be substantial expense such that a
noncompetition agreement could be enforced.'
The ineffectiveness of the 1962 statute following the Orkin decision led the
legislature to redraft the statute completely in 1989." It continued the general
prohibition ofall noncompetition agreements but provided exceptions to the general

45. Id.
46. Id. at 554. Again, although Louisiana does not require consideration, courts have in the past
used the term interchangeably with cause.
47. La. R.S. 23:921 (1934); see also Morgan, supra note 8,at 554.
48. Morgan, supra note 8, at 554-55 (citing Standard Brands, Inc. v. Zumpe, 264 F. Supp. 254,
263-66 (E.D. La. 1967); Nalco Chem. Co. v. Hall, 237 F. Supp. 678,681 (E.D. La.), aft'd, 347 F.2d 90
(5th Cir. 1965); Marine Forwarding & Shipping Co. v. Barone, 154 So. 2d 528, 530 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1963)).
49. Historical and Statutory notes of La. R.S. 23:921, (Supp. 2001); see also Morgan, supra note
8, at 555.
50. Historical and Statutory notes of La. R.S. 23:92 (Supp. 2001); see also Morgan, supra note
8, at 555.
51. 302 So. 2d 593 (La. 1974).
52. The Supreme Court likely added the gloss because ofone or more of the reasons discussed
infra in Part II.
53. Morgan, supra note 8 at 557.
54. Id. at 557-58.
55. Historical and Statutory Notes of La. R.S. 23:921(Supp. 2001).
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rule.56 Notably, the legislature removed the language requiring that an employer
incur some expense for a noncompetition agreement in the employment relationship
to be valid." The legislature revised the statute hoping that courts would enforce
certain noncompetition agreements. 8
The statute has essentially remained the same since 1989. However, in 1990 a
new subsection was added relating to noncompetition agreements for computer
programming, and minor changes were made to clarify that a person includes a
corporation and its shareholders. In 1991, a new subsection was added relating to
parties to a franchise. In 1995, the legislature added a sentence allowing independent
contractors to enter into noncompetition agreements. The last change to the statute
came in 1999, when the legislature added a sentence restricting the use of choice-offorum and choice-of-law clauses in employment contracts or collective bargaining
agreements.59
IV.

APPICATION OF LOUISIANA REVISED STATUTES
AMENDMENT

23:921

AFTER THE

1989

Apparently, the legislature sought to alter the Louisiana Supreme Court's
interpretation of Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:921 in Orkin when it amended the
statute in 1989.60 Based on the legislative response to Orkin, it might be expected that
a greater number of noncompetition agreements would have been upheld by the
courts. This, however, was not the outcome as courts struck down many agreements
on different rationales. Following is a survey ofthese decisions, categorized by issue
to highlight the bases upon which the courts enforced or refused to enforce
noncompetition agreements.
A. Failureto Adequately Define the Employer's Business

Louisiana courts read into Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:921 a requirement that
the employer's business be defined. The text ofthe statute makes no reference to the
definition ofan employer's business either as it existed prior to the 1989 amendment
or after.6' As a result ofthis new gloss, noncompetition agreements failing to define
the employer's business were held invalid, as will be discussed herein. The courts
were perhaps uneasy enforcing noncompetition agreements that would prohibit an
56. Id. The exceptions followed the general prohibition.
57. See Morgan, supra note 8, at 561.
58. Id.
59. Historical and Statutory Notes to La. R.S. 23:921 (Supp. 2001). For the full text ofthe statute
as it is currently written see supra note 2.
60. See Morgan, supra note 8, at 561. It has been correctly noted that the 1989 amendment
codified a general prohibition of all noncompete agreements, rather than a specific prohibition of
noncompetition agreements in the employment setting. Id.; La. R.S. 23:921(A)(1) (Supp. 2001); cf La.
R.S. 23:921 (1962).
61. See La. R.S. 23:921(C)(Supp. 2001).

20011

COMMENT

employee from working in many capacities; the agreements seemed unnecessarily
restrictive to protect the employer's interests.
In Daiquiri'sIIIon Bourbon, Ltd. v. Wandfluh,"2 the fifth circuit was hesitant to
enforce a n6ncompetition agreement that would have prevented the employee from
working in numerous capacities. In Daiquiri's,the plaintiff sought an injunction
enforcing anoncompetition agreement that stated: "Employee agrees that he shall not,
during any period of time that he performs services for employer or for a period of
two years thereafter directly or indirectly engage at any other place ofbusiness which
63
is the same or substantially similar to the business covered by this agreement." The
agreement defined the business as "the sale of frozen drinks for consumption by the
general public." The Fifth Circuit held the agreement null and void. One basis for
65
the court's decision was the overly broad definition ofthe employer's business. The
court refused to enforce the agreement because it would prevent the defendant from
selling items like ice cream, malts, and frozen lemonade, and thus would prevent the
defendant from working in a number of establishments that did not compete with the
plaintiff."
67
The first circuit in LaFourcheSpeech & Language Services, Inc. v. Juckett
similarly found a noncompetition agreement void because it failed to define the
employer's business.68 In that case, the plaintiff-employer sought to enforce a
69
noncompete clause in its employment contract with the defendant-employee. The
plaintiff claimed the defendant violated the noncompetition agreement because she
began engaging in a business similar to that of the plaintiff subsequent to her
termination. ° The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the clause was valid
under Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:921(C) because the statute does not require a
definition of the employer's business. Rather, the court relied on Daiquiri'sIII on
Bourbon, Ltd. v. Wandfluh which had held that noncompetition agreements must

62. 608 So. 2d 222 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1992), writ denied, 610 So. 2d 801 (1993).
63. Id. at 223.
64. Id.
65. The overly broad definition was the second reason the court gave. The first reason why the
court held the agreement null and void was that it failed to limit the scope of the restraint to specified
parishes or municipalities as required by La. R.S. 23:921(C) (Supp. 2001). Id. at 224.
66. Id. at 225 (citing Ingram Corp. v. Circle, Inc., 188 So. 2d 96, 98 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ
refused, 190 So. 2d 232 (1966)). The court stated that Louisiana law requires a noncompetition
agreement to specifically define an employer's business. It appears that the court may have been using
a "reasonableness standard" to hold the clause invalid due to an overbroad definition of the employer's
business.
67. 652 So. 2d 679 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 654 So. 2d 351 (1995).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 679.
70. Id. The noncompetition clause in the employment context provided the following: Upon the

termination of this agreement, voluntary or otherwise, Employee[Juckett] shall, for a period of two (2)
years from the date of termination, refrain from carrying on or engaging in a business similar to that of
the employer [LSLSI] within the Parishes of LaFourche, Terrebonne, Assumption, St. James, and St.
Mary. Id. at 680.
71. 608 So. 2d 222, 224 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1992), writ denied, 610 So. 2d 801 (1993).

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 61

specifically define the employer's business to be valid."1 The court noted that the

nature of LaFourche's business was not described in the contract. However, in its
petition, the plaintiff had described itself as a "rehabilitation agency providing
therapy services in the field of speech pathology, vocational rehabilitation,
occupational therapy, physical therapy, and social work services."7 Ifthe court had
accepted this definition of the plaintiffs business, the defendant would have been
prohibited from working in all those areas even though she was hired solely as a

speech therapist."' The court emphasized that noncompetition agreements are not
favored in Louisiana, that in order to be valid they must strictly comply with the
statutory requirements, and that they are strictly construed in favor of the employee
and against the party seeking enforcement."
B. Lack of GeographicalLimitation

Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:921 states that an employee may agree not to
compete with or solicit customers ofhis former employer "within a specified parish
or parishes, municipality or municipalities, or parts thereof, so long as the employer
carries on a like business therein." 6 The second and fourth circuits have interpreted
this clause to mean that a noncompetition agreement, to be valid, must specifically
name the parishes and/or municipalities in which it is to have effect.7 The third
circuit interpreted the same clause to mean that a noncompetition agreement, to be
valid, has to indicate in some manner the parish and/or parishes in which it is to
have effect.7 While both are reasonable interpretations, the first approach allows
courts to invalidate agreements that would otherwise be enforced but for a
technicality, while the second allows courts to enforce agreements that perhaps
ought not be enforced because the employee might not have actually known of the
extent of his obligation. Both approaches fail to consider that the most accurate
manner of determining the area in which an employee cannot compete or solicit

72.

652 So. 2d at 680. The court in Daiquiri'sfound the noncompetition agreement null because

it contained an'overly broad definition of the employer's business. Id.
73. Id.at681.

74. Id.
75. Id. at 680. It should be noted that the statute does not specifically require a definition of the
business. Rather, the statute states that "any person... may agree with his employer to refrain from...
engaging in a business similar to that of the employer." La. R.S. 23:921 (Supp. 2001). If it required a
definition, it would likely use the terminology"engaging in aspecifiedbusiness," similar to the language
later used in the statute, "within a specifiedparish or parishes." La. I.S. 23:921 (Supp. 2001).
76. La. R.S. 23:921(C) (Supp. 2001).
77. The employer must conduct a like business within those specifically named parishes. See La.
S. 23:921(C) (Supp. 2001). The four decisions of the second and fourth circuits interpreting the
geographical requirement clause, discussed herein, have required mechanical adherence to the statute.
78. The one decision of the third circuit interpreting the geographical requirement clause,
discussed herein, required a more general specification of the area; the agreement did not have to name
the parishes or municipalities to be valid.
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9
employees might not even require entire parish restrictions. In addition, the courts
8' °
seem to have read out the terminology, "or parts thereof," as no court has
considered that an entire parish designation may be overly restrictive.
In Comet Industries, Inc. v. Lawrence," the second circuit held a

noncompetition agreement unenforceable because it failed to set forth an appropriate
geographical limitation. In Comet, the plaintiff sought to enforce a noncompetition
agreement that would prohibit the defendant from competing anywhere in the
continental United States. 2 The court found the provision to be unenforceable

because it failed to specify the parishes where Comet conducted business. However,

the document contained a savings clause, stating that if any provision in the

noncompetition clause was excessively broad, then the clause should be limited to
83
make it compatible with applicable law. The plaintiff asked the court to reform the
noncompetition clause to make it applicable in the twenty-four parishes where the

company did conduct business.

The court, however, refused, stating that

noncompetition agreements are disfavored in Louisiana and that any agreement
seeking to fit into an exception to the general prohibition of such agreements must
strictly conform to the statute."
In Medivision, Inc. v. Germer," the fourth circuit affirmed the lower court's
denial of injunctive relief because the noncompetition agreement failed to specify
geographical limits." In Medivision, the agreement prohibited the former employee
from competing with employer's competitors during employment and prohibited
employee from "providing ophthalmological services within ten miles of any office
of the Center [Medivision] existing during the term of the agreement" for one year
8
after termination of the employment contract. 7 The term "center" as used in the
agreement was defined as "an eye care center currently located at [X location] and any
8
The court noted
future additional offices in the Greater New Orleans Area."
and the
competition,
Louisiana's strong public policy against contracts prohibiting
contracts
such
that
second circuit's statement in CometIndustries,Inc. v. Lawrence
8
must strictly adhere to the statutory requirements. The court found the "within ten

79.
80.
81.
82.

A more accurate method of determining the area to be restricted isdiscussed in Part X.
See La. R.S. 23:921(C) (Supp. 2001).
600 So. 2d 85 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writdenied. 604 So. 2d 1002 (1992).
Id. at 87. This isthe case which the appellate court in AMCOMrelied upon, and which Judge

Hightower in dissent distinguished. See discussion Part V.

83.

Id.

84. Id. The courtnoted alackofjurisprudence interpreting the amended 23:921. Itfoundsupport
for its conclusions in Taquino v. Teledyne Monarch Rubber Company, where the federal court found
that Louisiana law required a territorial limitation to be enforced. Comet Indus., 600 So. 2d at 88 (citing
893 F. 2d 1488 (5th Cir. 1990)). The second circuit likewise found a savings clause ineffective in
reviving a noncompetition agreement in Comet Indus., Inc. v. Colvmn, for the same reasons 600 So. 2d
85, 90 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1992), writdenied, 604 So. 2d 1002 (1992).
85. 617 So. 2d 69 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992), writ denied, 619 So. 2d 549 (1993).
86. Id. at 70.
87. Id. at 72.

88. Id.

89. Id.
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miles of any office" language insufficient to satisfy the statutory requirements. The
appellate court agreed with the trial judge that the defendant could not be certain of
the extent of the prohibition because the contract prohibited competition with offices
not yet established at the time ofentering into the contract. Additionally, the contract
failed to specify the proscribed areas, and therefore did not meet the requirements of
23:921. The court also rejected the plaintiffs argument that the area was in fact
specified because it was limited to the "Greater New Orleans Area." It found that
such a term created uncertainty as to the area covered by the agreement." Because
the contract was vague and ambiguous and failed to specify territorial limits with
clarity, the court held the agreement null and void.9
The fourth circuit again showed its reluctance to enforce noncompetition
agreements that failed to specify geographical limits in Water Processing
Technologies,Inc. v. Ridgeway.93 The case involved a distributorship agreement that

included a non-competition clause." The clause contained blanks into which the
geographical limitations of the agreement were to be inserted, but the blanks were
never completed.9 The court noted that noncompetition agreements are contrary to
public policy, and therefore they must be strictly construed in the favor of the
employee.96 The court consequently found the provision to be void because it failed
to specify the geographical limitations required by 23:921. Significantly, while the
court noted that limits could be inferred from the rest of the Distributorship
Agreement, it refused to reform the contract in the employer's favor. 7
In FrancoisChiropracticCenterv. Fidele,9 s the fourth circuit again declared null

a noncompetition agreement that failed to specify applicable locations. The
noncompetition agreement at issue provided that the contractor could not enter into
the same or similar practice "of any corporation or organization within a ten (10) mile
radius ofthe outer city limits ofNew Orleans, Louisiana."99 The court explained that
Louisiana has historically disfavored such agreements. It relied on a U. S. Fifth
Circuit opinion that had explained Louisiana's public policy on noncompetition
90. Id.
91. Id. The court also found that the term "offices ofthe Center" to be vague, as the plaintiff was
attempting to call one location, which the defendant visited once a month for one-half a day to see
patients, an office. Id.
92. Id. at 73.
93. 618 So. 2d 533 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993).
94. The trial court had decided that 23:921(C) was applicable because the distributorship created
an agency relationship between the parties. Id. at 535.
95. Id. at 534.
96. Id. at 536.
97. Id.
98. 630 So. 2d 923 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993).
99. Id. at 924. The agreement provided that Texas law would govern. The court applied
Louisiana Civil Code article 3540, which allows the parties to choose what law governs, except to the
extent that that law contravenes the public policy of the State whose law would otherwise be applicable.
The court first found the clause to be unenforceable under Texas law "because it is broader than
necessary to protect appellant's legitimate business interests." Id. at 926. The court then continued to
examine whether the contract's unenforceability would contravene the public policy of Louisiana.
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agreements, particularly that the 1989 amendment of23:921 did not reverse the public
policy disfavoring noncompetition agreements and that any contract seeking to
prohibit competition must strictly comply with the statutory requirements."° The
Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court ofAppeals found the agreement unenforceable as it
did not "clearly specify that the proscribed area is limited to the municipality ofNew
Orleans."'O'
Remarkably, in 1994 the third circuit in Allied Bruce Terminix Co., Inc. v.
Guillory'0 2 upheld a noncompetition agreement in which no geographical limitation
was specified by parish or municipality name. The case involved a pest control
worker who resigned from Terminix and began his own company, despite having
signed a noncompetition agreement.' 3 The agreement provided that defendant could
not compete with the plaintiff for a period of two years following termination of the
employment relationship in those parishes where plaintiff worked."° Although the
agreement did not specifically name the parishes, the trial court found the agreement
valid and enforceable because the court itself was able to identify them. Noting that
the noncompetition agreement provided expressly that the prohibition was "limited
to those parishes in which defendant has worked for Terminix during the term ofthe
agreement," the court held these parishes to be Lafayette and Acadia. i 5 Notably,
most circuits at this time were unwilling to add the names of the parishes to a
07
contract.'" The appellate court affnmed, finding the contract legally enforceable.
C. DuressandLack ofMutuality
Threatening to terminate employment if the employee refuses to sign a
noncompetition agreement has uniformly been held not to constitute duress. Although
an employer may have the legal right to threaten to terminate an at-will employee for
not signing a noncompetition agreement, the threat might sometimes be made to
secure the agreement even if the employer plans to fire the employee the next day.
While courts may conclude that threatening to terminate can never constitute duress,
a case-by-case analysis maybe more appropriate to prevent inequities from employers
abusing the right to threaten termination.
The fourth circuit rejected duress as vitiating one's consent to a noncompetition
agreement inLitigationReprographicsandSupport Services,Inc. v. Scott.' InScott,
one defendant/employee voluntarily left the employ of the plaintiff/employer while
the other two defendants were terminated when the plaintiff discovered they were

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
1993).
107.
108.

Id.
at 926, (citing Team Environmental Servs., Inc. v. Addison, 2 F.3d 124 (5th Cir. 1993)).
Id at 926.
649 So. 2d 652 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994), writdenied, 650 So. 2d 244 (1995).
Id. at 653.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Water Processing Technologies, Inc. v. Ridgeway, 618 So. 2d 533 (La. App. 4th Cir.
Allied,618 So. 2d at 649.
599 So. 2d 922 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992).
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planning to quit to begin a competing business with the first defendant. Thereafter,
the three defendants incorporated a business that provided similar services as the
plaintiff, which they operated in Orleans and Jefferson Parishes in direct competition
with the plaintiff.'" 9 The court found the agreement to be in compliance with the
amended Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:921 "° and rejected the defendants' arguments
that their consent was vitiated by duress."' The court reasoned that because the
legislature had changed the law making certain noncompete agreements enforceable,
conditioning employment upon the signing of such an agreement could not constitute
duress. Furthermore, because the defendants were at-will employees, the plaintiff
could terminate them at any time for any reason. Thus, the plaintiff's threat to
terminate them did not constitute duress for it had the legal right to do so."'
In Cellular One, Inc. v. Boyd,"3 the employer brought suit to enforce a
noncompetition agreement signed by the defendant-employees. The trial court issued
injunctions prohibiting the defendants from working in four parishes and from
soliciting customers of Cellular One." 4 On appeal the defendants asserted that the
trial court erred in enforcing a noncompetition agreement that lacked mutuality of
obligation and failed to provide sufficient consideration." 5 They claimed that
noncompetition agreements in an at-will relationship always lack mutuality and have
an insufficient cause." 6 The defendants presented an example of the inequities that
can arise when an employer utilizes a noncompetition agreement in an abusive
manner, such as when an employer hires an employee-at-will one day, fires him the
next without cause, and then enforces the noncompetition agreement to restrict him
from practicing his profession." 7 The court disagreed and stated that the inequities
suggested by defendants were not present in this case."' The court stressed that the
defendants had successful careers as sales representatives for more than three years9
and that the cause for them entering into the agreement was continued employment. "
The court noted that the legislature had already addressed the public policy
considerations raised by the defendants when it enacted Louisiana Revised Statutes
23:921; therefore, the court followed the language of the statute "which allows 'any20
person', including an at-will employee, to enter into a noncompetition agreement."'
at922.
109. Id.
110. The text of the agreement was not provided in the case.
at 923.
111.Id.
112. Id.The court did not consider the fact that the employee's at-will status may not theoretically
provide cause for the contract.
113. 653 So. 2d 30 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied,660 So. 2d 449 (1995).
at 31.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 32.
116. Id. at34.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. The court assumed that the legislature correctly weighed the public policy concerns, but
failed to consider that the legislature did not adequately address all those concerns. The court simply
stated that the legislature, after dealing with the issue for years, enacted 23:921 and thereby expanded
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The court also rejected the defendant's argument that the agreement was vitiated
by economic duress. Citing Civil Code article 1962,"' the court reasoned that the
something the plaintiff had a legal right to do,
threat ofterminating the defendants,
22
duress.'
constitute
not
could

Affirming the trial court's enforcement of a noncompetition agreement in
Allied Bruce Terminix Company, Inc v. Guillory,2 3 the third circuit rejected the
defendant's argument that his consent had been vitiated by economic duress.' 4 The
court relied on the holding in Litigation Reprographics" and Civil Code article
1962126 in concluding found that the threat of termination of employment did not
constitute duress because the plaintiff had the legal right to make the threat. 7 The
court also commented that the noncompetition agreement was a condition of
employment; as a result, no argument could be made that the agreement was
unenforceable for lack of consideration.' 2'
D. TreatmentofProfessionals
Whether or not professionals may enter into noncompetition agreements
presents difficult issues. Those in favor of application of noncompetition
agreements to professionals argue that professionals are in a stronger bargaining
position than nonprofessional employees are, and therefore, professionals should
be bound if they choose to enter into such an agreement. However, because a
professional bears the bulk of the expense of his training, employers of
professionals are likely to have less of a monetary investment at stake than
employers of nonprofessionals, and therefore noncompetition agreements may
unnecessarily restrict the post-termination activities of professionals. Assuming
that the employer needs the protection of a noncompetition agreement, a two-year
prohibition may be overly restrictive because the professional would have to leave
his profession and enter a new line of-work to make a living.' 9 The only other
option for the professional would be to uproot himself and establish his profession
outside the area of restriction, thereby losing his established clientele and
the use of noncompetition agreements. It noted that paragraph (A) of the statute expresses the strong
public policy against such agreements, while paragraph (C)states that any person may enter into such
contracts with their employer. Id.
121. Louisiana Civil Code article 1962 provides in part, "The threat of doing alawful actor a threat
ofexercising aright does not constitute duress." La. Civ. Code art. 1962.
122. Cellular One, 653 So. 2d at 35.
123. 649 So. 2d 652 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994), writdenied, 650 So. 2d 244 (La. 1995).
124. Id. at653.
125. 599 So. 2d 922 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992).
126. For the text of Louisiana Civil Code article 1962, see supra note 119.
127.

1992).
128.

Litigation Reprographics & Support Servs., Inc. v. Scott, 599 So. 2d 922 (La. App. 4th Cir.

Id. at 653.

129. Asking an employee, who is capable of working in many capacities, to find a job that does
not compete with his former employer, is much less burdensome than asking a professional, who is
trained to work in one field, to find ajob that does not compete with his former employer.
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reputation, an expensive and burdensome choice that is likely unrealistic for those
established and comfortable in a particular area.
Some states specifically prohibit the application of noncompetition agreements
to professionals. " ° Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:921 prohibits contracts which
restrain the exercise of a lawful profession,' but the exceptions which follow the
general prohibition provide a means of enforcing a noncompetition agreement
against certain professionals, unless some other protection exists elsewhere.'
Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:921(C) allows employees and independent contractors
to enter into noncompetition agreements with their employers; professionals are
either an employee or an independent contractor. Furthermore, Louisiana Revised
Statutes 23:921(D) allows partners of a partnership to enter into noncompetition
agreements upon or in anticipation ofa dissolution of the partnership; professionals
often form partnerships to transact business. Louisiana courts have not addressed the
specific issue of whether noncompetition agreements should be applied to
professionals.
In Francois Chiropractic Center v. Fidele,' the fourth circuit held a
noncompetition agreement invalid under Louisiana law because it did not specify the
geographical limitations. 3 The fourth circuit made no mention of the defendant's
status as a professional, and therefore, did not consider whether noncompetition
agreements should be applied to professionals. Rather, the court simply stressed the
commonly recited phrase that35noncompetition agreements must strictly conform to
the statute to be enforceable.

130. For example, Alabama's general statute concerning noncompetition agreements contains a
general prohibition of noncompetition agreements as applied to professionals. Ala. Code §8-1-1 (Michie
1993). Accounting, medicine, and veterinary medicine are considered professions for purposes of the
statute; these professions are not subject to the exception in subsection (b)of the statute. Malsberger,
Covenants Not to Compete, A State by State Survey, 60 (2nd ed., 1996) Inaddition, although it does
not have a statute covering noncompetition agreements generally, Delaware has a statute prohibiting any
restriction of doctors to practice medicine. 6 Del. C. §2702 (Michie Repl. 199and therefore 3). The
statute does not consider liquidated damages provisions to be noncompetition agreements enforces such
provisions if they are reasonable. Id. Similarly, Massachusetts has a statute making noncompetition
agreements unenforceable against doctors. Massachusetts General Laws chapter 112, §12X (Law. CoOp. 1991). Massachusetts, however, considers liquidated damages provisions to be unenforceable
noncompetition agreements. Id. Vermont has a statute prohibiting a school of cosmetology from
requiring a person to enter into a noncompetition agreement with the training organization or affiliate.
Vt. Stat. Ann. §647(c) (Michie Butterworth Cure. Supp. 1995). Those states which have adopted Model
Rules ofProfessional Conduct Rule 5.6 restrict the application of noncompetition agreements as applied
to attorneys.

131. See La. R.S. 23:921(A) (Supp. 2001).
132. For example, Rule 5.6 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits agreements in
which a lawyer's right to practice is restricted after termination of the employment or partnership
relationship. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.6. Those states which have adopted Rule 5.6
would restrict noncompetition agreements applied to attorneys.
133. 630 So. 2d 923 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993).
134. Id. at 926. See supraPart IV.B.
135. 630 So. 2d at 923.
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Minge v. Weeks,'36 a fourth circuit decision involving an employment contract
between an associate attorney and his law firm, sheds some light on the
permissibility of noncompetition agreements as applied to attorneys. InMinge, the
defendant signed an employment contract with a provision restricting his ability to
solicit former clients should he be discharged from the finm or otherwise leave the
firm.'37 According to the contract, if the associate did solicit clients he would be
required to pay the firm eighty percent of the net attorney fee generated by each
client. 3 s Instead of Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:921, the court looked to Rule 5.6
of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides that a lawyer cannot make a
partnership or employment agreement "that restricts the rights ofa lawyer to practice
after termination of the relationship, except an agreement concerning benefits upon
retirement."' 39 Noting the purpose of Rule 5.6 to preclude commercial arrangements
that interfere with the attorney-client relationship and the ability of a client to choose
the counsel of his choice, the court found that the financial disincentive provisions
ofthe agreement, though not directly restrictive, violated the rule. 4° The agreement
was thus void and unenforceable as against public policy.'4' The result reached by
the Minge court evidently aims to protect third persons, not the parties to the
agreement. This may suggest that if a third party were adversely affected by a
noncompetition agreement, then a court could have an alternate basis for not
enforcing the agreement.
The fifth circuit, however, concluded in Warnerv. CarimiLaw Firm" that not
every financial consequence would amount to a violation of Rule 5.6."' The
agreement at issue required the plaintiff, who left his law firm and took files, to
reimburse the law firm for the advanced costs. Furthermore, if the costs were not
reimbursed within ten days oftaking over the files, twenty-five percent of the owed
monies would be due as liquidated damages.'" The court distinguished Minge v.
136. 629 So. 2d 545 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993).
137. Id. at 546.
138. Id.
Although this provision appears to be similar to many other
noncompetition/nonsolicitation agreements, the court never used either of those terms to describe the
contract. Moreover, the court never even looked to La. R.S. 23:921 to decide the case.
139. Id. at 547.
140. The court relied on the case ofJacobv. Norris,McLaughlin& Marcus,which used the ABA
Code of Professional Responsibility, from which Louisiana's Rules of Professional Conduct are derived,
to reach a similar result. Id. (citing 607 A.2d 142, 146 (N.J. 1992)).
141. 629 So. 2d at 547. Cf.Winston v. Bourgeois, Bennett, Thokey and Hickey, 432 So. 2d 936
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1983). In Winston, the 1962 version of La. R.S. 23:921 applied. The case involved
a noncompetition clause in a partnership agreement that required a withdrawing partner to compensate

the partnership with a percentage of fees as a type of liquidated damages. The court upheld the
agreement, noting that the agreement did not restrict the withdrawing partner's ability to practice his

profession; he simply had to compensate his former partners if he chose to do so. The court also noted
that he entered the partnership contract freely, and that he received valuable benefits as a partner. If he
did not want to be subject to the noncompetition agreement, he could have remained an employee. Id.
at 940.
142. 678 So. 2d 561 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1996).
143. Id.
at 565.
144. Id.at 563.
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Weeks because the agreement did not penalize the attorney by making him pay most
ofthe generated fees to his former partners/partnership, but instead simply shifted
the burden of financing the cases to the attorney who took over the files.' 45 In
addition, the liquidated damages provision amounted to damages for delay and was
enforceable.'" The court found that a client's right to choose his attorney was not
subverted, and therefore the underlying policy ofRule 5.6 remained protected.'47
E. Summary ofDecisionsby CircuitandMiscellaneousIssuesPresented by
NoncompetitionAgreements
All circuits require technical adherence to the statute and all emphasize that
noncompetition agreements are against public policy and that noncompetition
agreements are to be strictly construed in the favor ofthe employee. However, the
circuits conflict on other issues. A brief summary of decisions from each circuit
follows to accentuate the differing policies developed by each circuit to evaluate
noncompetition agreements.
The first circuit has not established a clear policy towards noncompetition
agreements. It refuses to enforce agreements that fail to comply with "statutory
requirements" by not including a definition of the employer's business) 4 Because
the statute does not require a definition ofthe employer's business, the first circuit
perpetuates the judicial of gloss to Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:921 and thereby
shows an unwillingness to enforce noncompetition agreements that unnecessarily
restrict the activities of an employee. However, in CellularOne, the first circuit
upheld an agreement which did comply with the statutory requirements; in so doing
the court rejected the arguments that noncompetition agreements are inappropriate
in an at-will employment relationship.'49
The second circuit has denounced reformation as being in violation of public
policy. In Comet Industries,Inc. v. Lawrence, the agreement was unenforceable
because it did not specify the parishes where Comet conducted business; the court
specifically refused to reform the contract pursuant to a savings clause. 0 The court
reached the same conclusion in CometIndustries,Inc.v. Colvin, approving the trial
court's conclusion that reforming an overbroad agreement would be contrary to
public policy.'
145.
146.

Id. at 565.
Id.

147.

Id.

148. LaFourcheSpeech&Language Servs., Inc. v. Juckett, 652 So. 2d 679 (La. App. lstCir.), writ
denied, 654 So. 2d 351 (1995) (no definition of employer's business). Note that the statute does not
require adefinition of the employer's business.
149. Cellular One, Inc. v. Boyd, 653 So. 2d 30 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 660 So. 2d 449
(1995) (duress not an issue; cause iscontinued employment).
150. Comet Indus., Inc. v. Lawrence, 600 So. 2d 85, 87 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 604 So.
2d 1002 (La. 1992).
151. Id. at 89.
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Although only deciding one case concerning noncompetition agreements, the
third circuit has demonstrated that it is willing to enforce noncompetition
agreements as long as they comply with the spirit of Louisiana Revised Statutes
23:921. In Allied Bruce Terminix Co., Inc. v. Guillory, the court upheld an
agreement that did not specifically name the parishes in which it was to apply; the
court itself identified the parishes from the context of the agreement and enforced
the agreement against the former employee.'
Arguably, this was a type of
reformation which intimated the result ofAMCOM v. Battson. Every other circuit
requires the agreement to specifically name the applicable parishes or
municipalities for the agreement to be enforceable.
The fourth circcuit seems to disfavor noncompetition agreements. It requires
agreements to specifically name the applicable parishes or municipalities, holding
invalid one agreement that failed to do so.'53 An agreement that fails to specify the
parishes by failing to fill in the blanks on a form noncompetition agreement was also
held invalid, and the court stated it would not reform the contract even though the
parish was determinable, thus showing an aversion to reformation.' 54 Yet another
agreement was held invalid for failing to specify the applicable parishes; the court
concluded that "miles-radius" language does not satisfy the statutory requirements of
specifying the applicable parishes or municipalities. '"
It refused to enforce
noncompetition agreements against one class ofprofessionals, attorneys; however, the
court made no indication that it will refuse to enforce noncompetition agreements
against otherprofessionals.5 6 It upheld an agreement that complied with the statutory
requirements, rejecting the argument that economic duress vitiated consent. 7
The fifth circuit rendered one decision concerning noncompetition agreements,
refusing to enforce a noncompetition agreement because it created too broad a
restriction on the defendant's employment possibilities and because it did not
adequately define the business of the employer.' The requirement ofa definition of
the employer's business perpetuated the gloss added by the courts to Louisiana
Revised Statutes 23:921. The fifth circuit noted that it would restrict the application
of"noncompetition agreements" to attorneys because ofRule 5.6 ofLouisiana's Rules
ofProfessional Conduct, but would enforce provisions that did not interfere with the
right of a client to choose his attorney."
152.
153.

649 So. 2d 652 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994), writ denied, 650 So. 2d 244 (1995).
Medivision, Inc. v. Germer, 617 So. 2d 69 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 619 So. 2d 549

(1993).
154. Water Processing Technologies, Inc. v. Ridgeway, 618 So. 2d 533 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993).
155. Francois Chiropractic Ctr. v. Fidele, 630 So. 2d 923 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993).,
156. Minge v. Weeks, 629 So. 2d 545 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993). See also Francois Chiropractic Ctr.
v. Fidele, 630 So. 2d 923 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993). InFidek, where the court, although applying a
noncompetition agreement to a professional/chiropractor, did not address whether noncompetition
agreements should be applied to professionals.
157. Litigation Reprographics and Support Services, Inc. v. Scott, 599 So. 2d 922 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1992).
158. Daiquiri's III on Bourbon, Ltd. v. Wandfluh, 608 So. 2d 222 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1992), writ
denied, 610 So. 2d 801 (1993).
159. Warner v. Carimi Law Firm, 678 So. 2d 561 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1996).
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V. AMCOM V.BAmoN: A TURNING POINT
Prior to the AMCOM decision, most courts required strict compliance with
Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:921 for noncompetition agreements to be enforceable.
While other jurisdictions had addressed whether reformation was possible in
concompetion agreements, the Louisiana Supreme Court had not. In AMCOM, the
Louisiana Supreme Court briefly addressed the issue, yet left many related issues
unresolved.
A. The Appellate CourtDecision
In AMCOM of Louisiana,Inc. v. Battson60 the plaintiff sought to enjoin the
defendant from employment with a competing radio station in the same city after
termination.'' The trial court found that the agreement violated Louisiana Revised
Statutes 23:921 because the contract was geographically overbroad in prohibiting
Battson from working within a seventy-five mile radius of Shreveport or Bossier
City.' 62 Because the seventy-five mile provision included entire parishes or parts of
parishes that were not specified in the contract, the trial court found the provision to
be in violation of the statute. The trial court reformed the contract, apparently
pursuant to a severance clause' 63 in the contract, deleting the overly broad language
and limiting the clause to the geographical area statutorily allowed.'"
6
The court of appeals agreed that the provision was geographically overbroad. '
However, the appellate court reached an opposite conclusion regarding the result of
the statutory violation. The appellate court found reformation of the agreement
impossible. Relying on the general prohibition of non-competition agreements, the
court stated that it could not rewrite the overly broad language by deleting or adding
words to make it conform to the statute. 6 The court noted that in enacting Louisiana

160. AMCOM of Louisiana, Inc. v. Battson, 666 So. 2d 1227(La. App. 2d Cir.), reversed,670 So.
So. 2d 1223 (1996).
161. 666 So. 2d. at 1227.
162. Id.at 1229. The agreement provided that Battson could not compete in "Shreveport or Bossier
City, Louisiana, or in Caddo or Bossier Parishes, Louisiana, or within a seventy-five (75) mile radius
of Shreveport or Bossier City, Louisiana." Id.
163. The severance clause stated that "if any sentence, paragraph, clause, or combination of the
same is in violation of the law in any state where applicable, such sentence, paragraph, clause, or
combination of the same alone shall be void..., and the remainder of such paragraph and this Agreement
shall remain binding on the parties thereto." AMCOM, 666 So. 2d at 1230.
164. AMCOM, 666 So. 2d at 1228. Thus, Battson would be prohibited from competing in
Shreveport or Bossier City, or in Caddo or Bossier Parishes. Id. at 1230.
165. Id. at 1229.
166. Id. The majority relied in part on their decision in Comet Indus. v. Lawrence,, writdenied,
604 So.2d 1002 (La. 1992), where a non-competition agreement was found geographically overbroad
in that it prohibited the defendant from competing anywhere within the continental United States. The
agreement contained a savings clause that provided that if any provision were found overly broad, then
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Revised Statutes 23:921, the legislature declared that any agreement restraining a
person from exercising a lawful trade is null and void, except as provided in the
statute.'67 The court therefore required strict adherence to the statute; any deviation
would render the entire agreement null.
The dissent inAMCOMarguedthat reformation ofthe contract was appropriate.
The dissent stated that Comet' did not preclude a court from striking language from
an agreement to make it acceptable under the statute because that case was
distinguishable. In Comet, the agreement sought to prevent the defendant from
competing with his employer anywhere in the continental United States. As the
agreement plainly fell short of the statutory requirement of specifying the parishes
where competition was prohibited, the plaintiff requested that the court rewrite the
contract to prohibit the defendant from competing in the twenty-four parishes in
which it conducted business. The court stated that it required strict adherence to the
statute and therefore would not reform the agreement. 69 'In Comet, had the court
severed the language that violated the statute, it would have left no enforceable
contract. Unlike the situation in Comet, deleting the offending language from the
agreement in AMCOM would leave a perfectly enforceable contract: Battson would
not be able to compete in Shreveport or Bossier City, or in Caddo or Bossier
Parishes. 7 ° The dissent found a marked difference between the request of the plaintiff
in Comet to rewrite the agreement and the request of the plaintiffinAMCOMto sever
offensive language. The dissent stated: "The present contract is not one... purposely
drafted by an employer expecting the court system to reform an ambiguous provision
into the outer limits ofthe law..''. Moreover, severing the unacceptable terminology
would "avoid the harsh result of nullifying an entire agreement,"'7 and would be
more in sync with the general principle of contracts in that an "illegal or immoral
provision annuls the contract only to the extent thattheagreementdepends uponit.""'73
The dissent also argued that a "miles-radius" limitation is not a per se violation
of Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:92 1, reasoning that the purpose of the statute is to
limit the agreement to an area in which the employer actually conducts business, and
to place the employee on notice of exactly where competition is prohibited. 74 In
some circumstances, miles-radius language would better accomplish those two
purposes, as when an employer is a radio or television station, for such language best
they were to be limited and reduced to make it compatible with applicable law. Id. at 87 (citing 600 So.
2d 85 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1992)). The plaintiff wanted the court to reform the contract and make it
applicable in the twenty-four parishes where the company conducted business. However, the court
found that such agreements must strictly conform to the statute, as they are otherwise prohibited by law.
Comet, 600 So. 2d. at 88. The dissent relied on this same statement, yet reached a different result, as
will be discussed herein. AMCOM, 666 So. 2d at 1230.
167. AMCOM, 666 So. 2d at 1230. See also, La. R.S. 23:921(A)(1) (1998 and Supp. 2001).
168. Comet, 600 So. 2d at 85.
169. AMCOM, 666 So. 2d at 1229 (Hightower, J., dissenting)(citing Comet, 600 So. 2d at 88).
170. Id. at 1230.
171. Id. at 1231.
172. Id. at 1230.
173. Id. (emphasis added).
174. Id. at 1231.
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"
describes the area in which the employer does business. The dissent emphasized
that no court had held in any prior cases that miles-radius language was per se a
violation. Moreover, miles-radius specifications had been upheld in the courts of
Alabama and Florida, the two states that provided the model for Louisiana's current
statute. 76 The dissent urged the court to consider "the reasonableness of the entire
noncompete agreement under the existing circumstances," which would provide the
court a method ofinvalidating an otherwise valid contract. " The dissent ultimately
found that in this case the miles-radius provision not only met the requirements ofthe
statute but was reasonable.i17

B. AMCOM v. Battson: The LouisianaSupreme CourtDecision

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted writs on March 29, 1996.' The text of
the supreme court decision provided: "Judgment of the court of appeal is reversed.
Judgment ofthe trial court is reinstated." Justices Calogero and Lemmon would have
granted the writ and docketed.
VI. APPUCATION OF LOUISIANA REVISED STATUTES 23:921 AFrERAMCOM
Because the supreme court did not offer reasons for its decisions, uncertainty as
to the intent of its application was inevitable. Was the dissent of the appellate
decision on target? Should complete reformation be allowed, or should only
severances be allowed? Is the presence ofa savings clause necessary for any type of
reformation? Was the decision intended only to rectify problems with the
geographical limitations? Is reformation appropriate with only mile-radius type
clauses? These questions are only a few of those raised by the supreme court
decision.
Many states allow reformation ofoverbroad contracts. However, the degree of
reformation allowed varies from state to state. Some states have adopted the "blue
pencil" approach, which allows courts to strike provisions and enforce the
remainder.8 0 Others have adopted the "reasonable alteration" approach, which allows
a court to reform a contract so that it reflects the intent of the parties at the time of
2
Some states do not allow reformation in any circumstance."
contracting.''
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1232.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. AMCOM v. Battson, 670 So. 2d 1223 (La. 1996).
180. Arizona, for example, has adopted the "blue pencil" approach. Malsberger, supra note 132,
at 109-110 ( citing Olliver/Pilcher Ins. v. Daniels, 715 P.2d 137 (Ariz. 1986).) This is also the approach
of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. Id. The Louisiana Second circuit Court of Appeal appears
to have adopted a "blue pencil" approach. See,&g. Summit Inst. for Pulmonary Med. and Rehab., Inc.
v. Prouty, 691 So. 2d 1384 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writdenied,701 So. 2d 983 (1997); Swat 24 Shreveport
Bossier, Inc. v. Bond, 759 So. 2d 1047 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ granted,769 So. 2d 1217 (2000).
181. Alaska has adopted the "reasonable alteration" approach. Malsberger, supranote 132, (citing
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Although it is clear from AMCOM that Louisiana allows reformation, it is not clear
whether Louisiana has adopted the "blue pencil" approach, the "reasonable alteration"
approach, or some variation thereof.
Although AMCOM dealt only with the issue of reformation, the fact that the
Louisiana Supreme Court allowed reformation ofa noncompetition agreement so that
it could be enforced against an employee perhaps signified a shift towards favoring
noncompetition agreements. Not all lower courts appeared to be ready for such a
shift, as will be discussed below. A survey ofthe post-AMCOM decisions follows.
A. Failureto Adequately Define the Employer'sBusiness/Failureto State What
Employee is Prohibitedfrom Doing
After AMCOM, the lower courts have not taken a uniform policy to the
enforcement of noncompetition agreements. The second circuit has interpreted
Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:921 narrowly, such that an employer is limited in what
he may restrict his employees from doing after termination of employment. 3 The
third circuit, on the other hand, has concluded that an employer may prohibit his
employee from working for a competitor in any capacity.8 4 The position ofthe fourth
circuit falls somewhere in between, allowing an employee to work for a competitor
but restricting the jobs that may be held when employed by a competitor.8 5 The third
circuit has removed the judicial gloss from Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:921 and no
longer requires a definition of an employer's business. 8 " The first circuit has
conditioned that conclusion by stating that if an agreement does contain a definition,
it may not prohibit a former employee from performing services not provided to the
former employer.8 7
8
In SummitInstituteforPulmonaryMedicineandRehabilitation,Inc. v. Prouty,
the second circuit closely examined Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:921 and its
meaning when faced with a noncompetition agreement restricting a former employee
from working in a number of capacities. The defendant, who had held a position in
Summit's business development and marketing department, had signed a
noncompetition agreement prohibiting him from holding ajob as an officer, director,

Data Mgmt. v. Greene, 757 P.2d 62 (Alaska 1988)). The third circuit seems to have adopted a
"reasonable alteration" approach. See, eg.Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. v. Untereker, 731 So. 2d 965
(La. App. 3d Cir.), writdenied, 747 So. 2d 40 (1999).
182. Arkansas does not allow reformation of overbroad provisions. Malsberger, supra note 132,
at 124-25, (citing Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc. v. Vroman, 489 S.W.2d I (Ark. 1973). Nor does Georgia.)
Id. at 316, (citing Drumheller v. Drumheller Bag & Supply, 420 S.E.2d 331, 334 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992)).
183. See Prouty,691 So. 2d at 1384; Bond, 759 So. 2d at 1047.
184. See Moreno & Assoc. v. Black, 741 So. 2d 91 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 745 So. 2d 606

(1999).
185. See Scariano Brothers, Inc. v. Sullivan, 719 So. 2d 131 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writdenied, 727
So. 2d 452 (1998).
186. See Moores Pump & Supply, Inc. v. Laneaux, 727 So. 2d 695 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1999).
187. See Baton Rouge Computer Sales, Inc. v. Miller-Conrad, 767 So. 2d 763 (La. App. Ist Cir.
2000).
188. 691 So. 2d 1384 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied,701 So. 2d 983 (1997).
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partner, employee, or consultant with a competitor for one year after the end of the
employ." 9 After closely analyzing the words of the statute, the court interpreted the
two restraints listed in Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:921(C) 9 ° to allow the employer
to prevent a former employee from doing two things: (1) opening his own competing
business; and (2) being employed in a competitor's business in a position where he
solicits the customers of his former employer.Y The court acknowledged that the
statute could be interpreted differently, but refused to enforce the agreement.9 2
Moreover, the court refused to reform the contract pursuant to AMCOM because it
would have to rewrite the provision into the outer limits ofthe, law, thereby giving the
employer the most protection the law allows rather than that for which the employer
bargained. In addition, if the court deleted the offensive section, no enforceable
provision would remain. 3 The narrow interpretation of Revised Statutes 23:921
suggests that the second circuit would not adopt a policyfavoring noncompetition
94
agreements.
The second circuit found another agreement unenforceable in SWAT 24
ShreveportBossier,Inc. v. Bond. 95 The court followed the rationale of Summit and
again found the agreement, which would have prevented the defendant from holding
a position as an "officer, employee, director, agent or consultant of any business
which is in direct or indirect competition with SWAT 24," to be overbroad. Such a
restriction would prevent the defendant from working for a company who happened
to compete with the plaintiff, even if the position held would not put the former
employer at a disadvantage. The court deleted the overbroad language and found that
nothing remained in the contract to prohibit the defendant's conduct.9 6 The court
189.

Id. at 1385.

190. The two restraints ofSection C are: (1)that an employee may agree to refrain from carrying
on or engaging in a business similar to that of the employer, and (2) that an employee may agree to
refrain from soliciting customers of the employer. La. R.S. 23:921 (Supp. 2001). For the full text of
Section C,see supra note 2.
191. Prouty, 691 So. 2d. at 1387. It seems that the court was looking to the purpose of the statute,
which is undoubtedly to protect the employer from having his employee compete with him. The second
circuit's interpretation of La. RKS. 23:921 appears to be consistent with that purpose in that it only limits
the defendant/employee from working in positions that affect the competitive advantage of the former
employer.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1388-89. The court has interpreted AMCOM to only require reformation by severing
clauses and enforcing the remainder, much like the dissent had concluded at the appellate level of
AMCOM. The court here distinguished AMCOM because once the offensive sections were deleted, no
enforceable provision remained.
194. It is possible that the reason for interpreting the statute so narrowly was a response to

AMCOM. The second circuit may have been opposed to reformation because ofthe power itwould give
employers. Because the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed reformation in certain instances in AMCOM,
the second circuit may have wanted to find a way to limit that power, and therefore interpreted the
statute narrowly so that employers would not be able to enforce noncompetition agreements against
many employees.
195. 759 So. 2d 1047 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writgranted, 769 So. 2d 1217 (2000). The Louisiana
Supreme Court had not published a decision at the time ofthe writing of this article.
196. Id. at 1052.
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noted that it has maintained a narrow interpretation regarding noncompetition
agreements.
In Scariano Brothers, Inc. v. Sullivan,'97 the fourth circuit upheld a
noncompetition agreement that was similar to the one the second circuit struck down
in Summit. 9 The court noted that the courts of the state have been consistent in
construing such agreements in the employee's favor, regardless of whether the 1989
revision signified a shift in public policy.'" The defendant argued that the agreement
was overly broad because it prevented him from working in any capacity for a
competitor, as the injunction prevented him from rendering any services to a
competitor."° He relied on Summit, claiming it stood for the proposition that an
employee should not be prohibited from doing any and all types of work for a
competitor.20 ' The appellate court, however, found that Summit was illogical in
concluding that "the statutory language only prohibits an employee from conducting
'
his/her own business in competition with a former employer."2' The court declined
to follow Summit and deleted the provision that prevented the defendant from
rendering services to a competitor, citing AMCOM. °3 The decision allowed the
defendant to work for the competitor, so long as he did not engage in a business
similar to that of his former employer. ' '
197. 719 So. 2d 131 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied. 727 So. 2d 452 (1998).
198. The agreement in Scariano provided:
Employee and the Company further expressly acknowledge that the Company Business Area
includes the parishes and counties named above. Employee will not, during the term of this
Agreement and for a period of two years from the date of the termination of his employment,
whether as owner, principal, agent, partner, officer, employee, independent contractor,
consultant, stockholder, licensor or otherwise, alone or in association with any other person,
directly or indirectly (i) solicit any customers of the Company within the Company Business
Area, (ii) carry on, be engaged or take part in the Company's Business or in a business
similar thereto within the Company's Business Area, or (iii) render services to or own, share
in the earnings of, or invest in the stock, bonds or other securities of any other person or
entity directly or indirectly engaged in the Company's Business or in a business similar
thereto within the Company Business Area; provided, however, that Employee may own
passive investments in the securities of any similar business (but without otherwise
participating in such similar business) if such securities are listed on any national or regional
securities exchange or are registered under Section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, as amended.
Id. at 134-35. But see supra note 193 and accompanying text.
199. Id. at 134. Although the courts consistently recited that noncompetition agreements are
strictly construed in the employee's favor, this was not always the case. Ifit were, the fourth circuit may
have found the threat of termination duress in Litigation Reprographics, and the first might have found
there to be lack of cause in an at-will employment relationship in Cellular One. After AMCOM, though
courts still recite that noncompetition agreements are strictly construed in the employee's favor, very
few actually were because courts reformed and enforced them.
200. Id. The defendant relied on Summit Institutefor Pulmonary Medicine andRehabilitation, Inc.
v. Prouty 691 So. 2d 1384 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 701 So. 2d 983 (1997).
201. Scariano, 719 So. 2d at 134.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 135.
204. This decision simply modified the Summit decision. While the Summit decision only
prohibited an employee from opening his own competing business or from working for the competitor
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In Moores Pump and Supply, Inc. v. Laneaux, °5 the third circuit upheld a
noncompetition agreement that did not contain a definition of the employer's
business. The court found the statute did not require one and that the parties to the
agreement knew what business Moore conducted. 2" This conclusion accurately
reflects the text of the statute, which does not require a definition of the employer's
business to be valid. 0 7 The court, without stating that it was doing so, removed the
gloss from the statute, which had been added to the statute in cases prior to AMCOM
and which required a definition of the employer's business to be valid. 08
The most recent case from the third circuit is Moreno andAssociates v. Black,2"
wherein the court found a noncompetition agreement enforceable, despite obstacles
that would have made it unenforceable in other circuits. The trial judge held the
contract unenforceable on two grounds: first, the provision was geographically
overbroad; 0 second, the agreement was overbroad in what it prohibited the
defendant from doing. The agreement prevented the defendant from directly or
indirectly owning, managing, operating, controlling, being employed by,
participating in, or being connected "in any manner with the ownership,
management, operation, or control" of any competing business."' The appellate
court reached a different conclusion, finding the prohibition valid. The court relied
on the agreement upheld in AMCOM, which contained similar language and which
the court concluded had been sanctioned by the supreme court. 2 The court further
concluded that such a prohibition was clearly authorized by Louisiana Revised
Statutes 23:921, which provides in pertinent part that an employee may agree to
refrain "from carrying on or engaging in a business similar to that of the
employer."2"' Therefore, the court enforced the agreement, finding statutory
authorization of the provision.
in a position that solicited customers of the former employer, this decision adds the restriction that an
employee cannot work for a competitor in a position that competes with his former employee. Notably,
this interpretation of La. P.S. 23:921 allows an employee to work for a competitor so long as he is not
competing with his former employer; the First circuit would not allow an employee to work for a
competitor in any capacity. See, e.g. Moreno &Associates v. Black, 741 So. 2d 91 (La. App. 3d Cir.),
writdenied, 745 So. 2d 606 (1999).
205. 727 So. 2d 695 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1999).
206. Id. at 698.
207. See La. R.S.23:921(C) (Supp. 2001).
208. For cases that required a definition ofthe employer's business, see supra Part W.A.
209. 741 So. 2d 91 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied 745 So. 2d 606(1999).
210. Id. at 93. The first ground will be discussed infra Part Cof this section.
211. Id. at 93-94.
212. Id. at 94. The agreement in AMCOM was in fact similar. It stated, "EMPLOYEE will not,
as principal, employer-stockholder, co-partner, employee or in any other individual or representative
capacity whatsoever, enter into or engage directly or indirectly in the performances of any services for
any other radio station or competitor ofAMCOM..." AMCOM v. Batson, 666 So. 2d at 1227, 1229 (La.
App. 2d Cir.), reversed,670 So. 2d 1223 (La. 1996). Neither the second circuit nor the supreme court
addressed the issue of whether the agreement was overly broad in what it restricted the defendantemployee from doing.
213. Id. citing La. .S.
23:921(C) (Supp. 2001).
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The first circuit upheld a noncompetition agreement with no definition of the
employer's business in Baton Rouge Computer Sales, Inc. v. Miller-Conrad."4 In
that case, the plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant from competing with or
soliciting customers of the plaintiff in certain specified parishes for one year after
termination of her employment. The trial court held the agreement invalid because
(1) it failed to define the plaintiff's business with enough specificity; (2) it did not
describe defendant's job duties; and (3) it was not dated.21 The appellate court
disagreed and held the agreement valid, reasoning that the law does not require a
definition of the employer's business."' It distinguished the case from LaFourche
and other cases, stating that those cases had all contained overly broad definitions
of the business, and would therefore prevent employees in engaging in more
activities than were done for the former employer."t 7 The court stated: "There can
be no doubt that Miller-Conrad knew exactly what type of business she was agreeing
not to engage in when she signed the noncompetition agreement." ' The court
therefore remanded the case for trial on the merits." 9 Thus, the first circuit does not
require a definition ofthe employer's business for a noncompetition agreement to be
enforceable, but ifone is provided in the agreement, it must not be overly broad in
what it restricts the employee from doing.
B. Lack ofGeographicalLimitation
Agreements lacking an appropriate geographical limitation were held invalid less
often following AMCOM. Both the third and fourth circuits have upheld agreements
that would have prohibited the defendant/employee from working in parishes in which
the former employer did not carry on a like business by reforming the contract
pursuant to a severance clause and striking parishes."2 The first circuit has been
willing to reform overly broad contracts by deleting parishes, but would not reform
a contract by addingparish names, particularly in a contract containing no savings or
severance clause. 22' The third circuit differed from the first circuit in that it reformed
a noncompetition agreement, which contained no savings or severance clause and
which failed to name the applicable parishes, stating that the parishes were
identifiable.222
214. 767 So. 2d 763 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2000).
215. Id. at 764.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 765.
218. Id.
219. It seems that the trial court will have to determine whether her new job is a similar business
as plaintiff's.
220. See Dixie Parking Serv., Inc. v. Hargrove, 691 So. 2d 1316 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1997); see also
Moreno and Associates v. Black, 741 So. 2d 91 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writdenied,745 So. 2d 606 (1999).
221. See Turner Prof'l Servs., Ltd. v. Broussard, 762 So. 2d 184 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied,
770 So. 2d 356 (2000).
222. See Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. v. Untercker, 731 So. 2d 965 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied,
747 So. 2d 40 (1999). This decisidn was much like its decision in Allied Bruce Terminix Co., Inc. v.
Guillory. See supra Part IV.B.
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223
In Dixie Parking Service, Inc. v. Hargrove,
the fourth circuit enforced a
noncompetition agreement that would have prohibited the defendant from working in
parishes where the plaintiff did not actually conduct business. The court recited
language that Louisiana has a strong public policy against noncompetition agreements,
and that they must be strictly construed in the employee's favor.2" Despite this policy,
the court affirmed the trial court's use ofa severability clause contained in the agreement
to delete the nine extra parishes and apply the contract to Jefferson and Orleans Parishes,
the two parishes where the plaintiff did conduct business.225 The appellate court
analogized the case to AMCOM and concluded that the supreme court's reinstatement
22 6
of the trial court's opinion lent support to the reformation of the contract.
The third circuit again upheld a noncompetition agreement which did not specify
precise geographical limitations in PetroleumHelicopters,Inc. v. Untereker.2" There,
the plaintiff sought to enforce a noncompetition agreement prohibiting defendant from
"carrying on or engaging in asimilar business, and refrain[ing] from soliciting customers
of PHI within the parishes in which PHI carries on a like business."22 Although the
court recited the typical rhetoric that provisions of noncompetition agreements are
strictly construed in the employee's favor, it reversed the trial court's opinion that had
held the agreement unenforceable. 29 The court stated: "Although the parishes are not
specifically identified by name, they are identifiable. Furthermore, considering
[defendant's] position with PHI, he would surely be aware ofthe parishes in which PHI
conducts its business."23 The court found that the language ofthe agreement complied
with the statutory requirements and therefore enforced the agreement.'
The third circuit in Moreno andAssociates v. Black232 upheld a noncompetition
agreement despite the fact that the provision was geographically overbroad.2" The

223.

691 So. 2d 1316 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1997).

224.
225.

Id. at 1320.
Id.

226. Id.at 1321.
227. 731 So. 2d 965 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied,747 So. 2d 40 (1999).
228. Id. at 968 (alterations in original).
229.

Id.

230.

Id. The defendant was employed as Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of PHI. Id.

at 965.
231.

Id. at 968. The court made no reference to any savings or severance clause. The third circuit

upheld another agreement in Moores Pump and Supply, Inc. v. Laneaux,727 So. 2d 695 (La. App. 3d

Cir. 1999). In Moores Pump and Supply, the plaintiff argued that the contract was geographically
overbroad because it prohibited him from working in 43 parishes when the company did not have
projects ongoing in every parish. The third circuit court disagreed, reasoning that such a fact did not
require a finding that the company was not doing business therein. Id at 698. The court found it
sufficient that the company solicited customers in all forty-three parishes to satisfy the statutory
requirement that the "employer carries on a like business therein." Id.; La. R.S. 23:921 (C)(Supp. 2001).
It is not evident why soliciting customers equates with carrying on a like business, considering projects
were not being conducted in all forty-three parishes. This decision further demonstrates the tendency

of the third circuit to enforce noncompetition agreements.

232. 741 So. 2d 91 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writdenied,745 So. 2d 606 (1999). Moreno was discussed
previously in Part A of this section.
233. Id. at 93. The second argument of the defendant, also rejected by the third circuit, was that
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clause as written would have prohibited competition in twenty-four specified parishes,
two counties in Texas, and all oil and gas drilling platforms or rigs in the Gulf of Mexico
located outside the boundaries of Louisiana and Texas.234 The plaintiff's business was
limited to Lafayette and Iberia Parishes. Instead offinding the entire agreement null and
void as the trial court had, the appellate court deleted the objectionable references
pursuant to the severability clause in the contract.235
The first circuit held a noncompetition agreement unenforceable in Turner
ProfessionalServices, Ltd. v. Broussard.36 The agreement at issue sought to prevent
the defendant from competing with or soliciting customers of the plaintiff "within the
state of Louisiana, so long as Turner Professional Services, Ltd., carries on a like
business in said areas." 7 Even though the contract did not specify the parishes or
municipalities in which the plaintiff operated, the trial court reformed the contract based
on the defendant's testimony and enjoined him from competing or soliciting in nine
parishes.23 The appellate court emphasized, as courts prior to AMCOM had, that
noncompetition agreements must be strictly construed in the employee's favor and that
they must strictly adhere to the statutory requirements.239 The court noted that some
courts had allowed reformation of contracts in certain situations, citing AMCOM and
24 °
Petroleum Helicopters v. Untereker.
However, it declined to follow Petroleum
Helicopters,which had reformed and enforced a contract in which the parishes were not
specified but were identifiable. The court stated: "Revised Statute[s] 23:921(B) [sic]
is an exception to Louisiana public policy against noncompetition agreements, and as
such must be strictly construed. Simply complying with 'the spirit of 921' is not
sufficient."24' Emphasizing that the contract contained no severability or savings clause,
the court held that the contract should not have been reformed and dismissed the
plaintiff's suit. 42
C. Duress
The AMCOM decision did not alter the holding that economic duress does not
vitiate consent to a noncompetition agreement. For example, the third circuit rejected
the argument ofduress in MooresPumpandSupply,Inc. v. Laneaux.243 The defendant
did not receive the noncompetition agreement until three weeks after his employment
commenced. 2" Citing LitigationReprographics& SupportServices, Inc. v. Scott,24

the agreement was overbroad in what it prohibited the defendant from doing. See supra Part VI.A.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. 762 So. 2d 184 (La. App. Ist Cir.), writ denied, 770 So. 2d 356 (2000).
237. Id. at 185.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 186.
241. Id. at186. The court was referring to La. R.S. 23:921(C), not La. R.S. 23:921(B).
242. Id.
243. 727 So. 2d 695 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1999). See supraParts VI.A and VI.B.
244. Moores Pump and Supply, Inc. v. Laneaux, 727 So. 2d 695, 698 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1999).
245. 599 So. 2d 922 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992).
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the court stated that an employee is not under duress if his employer threatens to fire
him for not signing a noncompetition agreement.246 Thus, duress has been rejected
as a vice ofconsent to a noncompetition agreement both before and after the AMCOM
decision."47

D. Reformation
The primary issue in AMCOM was whether a noncompetition agreement could be
reformed."S Because the Louisiana Supreme Court did notgive reasons forreinstating the
opinion of the trial court (which had reformed the contract), uncertainty arose as to the
implications ofthat decision. For example, the fourth circuit inDixieParkingService,Inc.
v. Hargrove""reformed a geographically overbroad noncompetition agreement deleting
some parishes and enforcing the remainder.25 ° The third circuit similarly reformed an
overly broad provision in Moreno andAssociatesv. Black.25' The third circuit extended
the reformation power in PetroleumHelicoptersInc. v. Untereker"2 by determining and
adding the parishes in which the agreement was to apply.253 In Turner Professional
Services, Ltd.v. Broussard,' the first circuit refused to follow the fourth circuit, stating
that it would reform overly broad contracts by deleting offensive provisions but not by
addingprovisions. 5 The second circuit expressed a similaropinion inSwat24Shreveport
Bossier,Inc. v. Bond, 6 when it struck offensive language and found that no enforceable
provision remained. Thus, the only consensus is that offensive provisions maybe stricken
from a noncompetition agreement and the remainder enforced.
The third circuit, in contrast, finds authority for reforming an otherwise invalid
noncompetition agreement in the language of Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:921, even in
the absence of a savings or severance clause. In Henderson Implement, Co., Inc. v.
Langley," the court reformed an overly broad contract by deleting language so that it

246.
247.

Id.
Cf Cellular One v. Boyd, 653 So. 2d 30, 34 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied,660 So. 2d 449

(1995).
248. See AMCOM of La. v. Battson, 666 So. 2d 1227 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 670 So. 2d
1223 (1996).
249. 691 So. 2d 1316 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1997). This case was discussed in Part VI.B.
250. Id.at 1320-21.
251. 741 So. 2d91 (La. App. 3dCir.),writdenied,745 So. 2d 606(1999). This case was discussed
in Parts VI.A and VI.B.
252. 731 So. 2d 965 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied,747 So. 2d 40(1999). This case was discussed
in Part VI.B.
253. Id. at 968. The third circuit does not consider this to be reformation. Rather, it concludes
that language from which the parishes or municipalities can be identified complies with the statutory
requirement. See id.
254. 762 So. 2d 184 (La. App. Ist Cir.), writ denied, 770 So. 2d 356 (2000). This case was
discussed in Part VI.B.
255. Id.
256. 759 So. 2d 1047 (La. App. 2d Cir. ), writ granted,769 So. 2d 1217 (2000). This decision was
discussed in supra Part VIA.
257. 707 So. 2d 482 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1998).
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would reflect the clear intentions ofthe parties. The noncompetition agreement purported
to prevent the defendant from competing with "Henderson," defined as "Henderson
Implement Co., Inc., its subsidiary and affiliated corporations," inJefferson Davis Parish"'
The defendant argued that he wag hired to work as a store manager in Welsh, Louisiana
only, and that the agreement sought to prevent him from competing with any of
Henderson's affiliates, even though he only worked at Henderson's Welsh location. 9 The
trial courtjudge found that the agreement was a standard form where blanks were filled in,
that Henderson Implement was the only company of the group ofaffiliated companies that
did business in Jefferson Davis Parish, and the agreement was limited to Jefferson Davis
Parish."o The trial court therefore had effectively deleted the language "subsidiary and
affiliated corporations" from the contract The plaintiffargued that the trial court erred in
deleting this language because the contract; unlike the one in AMCOM upon which it
relied, contained no severability clause.2"' The appellate court disagreed with the plaintiff,
stating that "it is not necessary that an entire agreement containing a provision against
public policy be declared null and void."26' Without offering an explanation, the court
stated that Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:921 clearly allowsfor the reformation of an
otherwiseinvalidprovision. 3 It cited the text from 23:921 (A) and simply concluded that
it meant that a court could reform a provision. 2"
E. Summary ofDecisions by the Different Circuits
Many more noncompetition agreements have been enforced since AMCOM's
recognition of reformation as an alternative to invalidation. Inconsistencies, however, do
exist in the circuit court decisions. A summary ofthe decisions from the different circuits
follows to elucidate the policies of each circuit toward noncompetition agreements.
The first circuit agrees with the third circuit that Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:921
does not require a definition of an employer's business to be valid.265 However, if the
agreement contains a definition of the employer's business, it cannot be overly broad such
that it prevents former employees from engaging in more activities than were performed
for the former employer.'" The only decision by the first circuit with respect to
reformation deals with a geographical provision;6 . the language of the decision
does not indicate whether reformation is possible with other offensive provisions.6 8
258.
259.
260.
261.

Id. at 483. The period was two years after termination. Id.
Id. at 485.
Id.
Id.

262. Id.
263.

Id. at486. Since the third circuit finds reformation power in the text of La. R.S. 23:921, it is

unsurprising that it is willing to add provisions to an otherwise invalid noncompetition clause.
264.

Id.. For the text of23:921(A), see supranote 2.

265. See Baton Rouge Computer Sales, Inc. v. Miller-Conrad, 767 So. 2d 763 (La. App. 1st Cir.
2000).
266. Id. at 765.
267. See Turner Prof'l Servs., Ltd. v. Broussard, 762 So. 2d 184 (La. App. Ist Cir.), writ denied,
770 So. 2d 356 (2000).

268. Id. All the cases cited by the court as authority dealt with geographical provisions. For
example, the court cited AMCOM v. Battson,Dixie ParkingService, Inc. v.Hargrove,and Petroleum
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The first circuit requires the inclusion of a savings or severance clause to permit
reformation of geographically overbroad provisions, and will delete but not add
provisions in reforming.269 Furthermore, the first circuit requires that a
noncompetition agreement specifically name the parishes or municipalities in which
the agreement is to have effect.27

The second circuit has taken an extremely restrictive interpretation of
Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:921, holding that the statute only allows an employer
to prohibit an employee from opening his own competing business and to prohibit
an employee from soliciting customers of the former employer."" The two cases
decided by the second circuit involved provisions that sought to prohibit the
defendant-employee from working in any capacity for a competitor. "2 Although
the court stated that overbroad geographicalprovisions must be reformed and
enforced if possible pursuant to AMCOM, it was willing to delete provisions
unrelated to the geographical provisions. 2" Notably, in both instances deleting the
offensive provisions left no enforceable agreement. 4 Perhaps the court would
have concluded that reformation is inappropriate outside the context of
geographical provisions if an enforceable agreement would have remained. The
court did not reach the issue of whether it required an adequate definition of the
employer's business."'
Compared to the second circuit, the third has adopted a liberal interpretation
of both the statute and AMCOM. The third circuit holds that the statute does not
' The third circuit also
require a definition of the employer's business to be valid. 76
holds that an employee can be prohibited from working for a competitor in any
capacity, concluding that such agreements have been sanctioned in AMCOM.2"
With respect to geographical provisions, the third circuit deviates from other
Helicopters,Inc. v. Untereker. Id. It isnot clear whether the court cited only these cases because the
issue before it involved a geographically overbroad provision, or because the court believes that
reformation is only appropriate with respect to such provisions.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. See Summit Institute for Pulmonary Medicine and Rehabilitation, Inc. v. Prouty, 691 So. 2d
1384 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 701 So. 2d 983 (1997); Swat 24 Shreveport Bossier, Inc. v. Bond,
759 So. 2d 1047 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writgranted,769 So. 2d 1217 (2000).
272. Id.
273. See Swat 24 Shreveport Bossier, Inc., 759 So. 2d at 1050. The court did not seem to be
willing to add provisions; the language of the decision indicated that deleting provisions was the only
option. The court noted the third circuit's holding in Petroleum Helicopters,Inc. v. Untereker,731 So.
2d 965 (La. App. 3d Cir. ), writ denied,747 So. 2d 40 (La. 1999), that parishes need not be specified if

they are identifiable. The court then stated that it, by contrast, has maintained a narrow interpretation
regarding noncompetition agreements, suggesting that it would not enforce an agreement that did not
specify parishes, even if identifiable. See id. at 1051.
274. See Summit, 691 So. 2d at 1389; Swat 24 ShreveportBossier,Inc., 759 So. 2d 1047 (La. App.
2d Cir.), writ granted,769 So. 2d 1217 (2000).
275.

Swat 24 Shreveport Bossier. Inc., 759 So. 2d at 1052.

276. See Moores Pump and Supply, Inc. v. Laneaux, 727 So. 2d 695, 698 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1999).
277. See Moreno and Associates v. Black, 741 So. 2d 91 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied,745 So.
2d 606 (1999).
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circuits in that it does not require the agreement to specifically name parishes or
municipalities; rather, the parishes or municipalities simply have to be identifiable
in order to comply with 23:921 278 The third circuit has reformed contracts with
overbroad geographic provisions by deleting provisions and enforcing the
remainder." 9 It traces reformation power to the text of the statute, which allows it
to delete any offensive provisions, even in the absence of savings or severance
clauses.280 Notably, the third circuit has enforced every noncompetition agreement
that it has considered since AMCOM.2'
The policy ofthe fourth circuit lies somewhere between that of the second and
third. It will allow a former employee to.render services to a competitor, as long
as such employees are not helping the new employer compete.28" Regarding the
extent of reformation, the fourth circuit has reformed a contract by deleting parishes
pursuant to a severability clause;28 the language ofthat decision indicates that any
unenforceable provision could be deleted pursuant to a severability clause."'4
The fifth circuit has heard only one case since AMCOM. Although the
agreement was upheld, the case does not shed light on the policy of the circuit.285
VII. PROBLEMS WITH LOUISIANA'S APPROACH

A. RequiringMechanicalAdherence to LouisianaRevised Statutes 23:921

Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:921 is the type of statute desired by practitioners
because courts simply require mechanical adherence in order for an agreement to be
enforceable. Thus, an attorney theoretically can draft a noncompetition agreement
278. See Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. v. Untereker, 731 So. 2d 965, 968 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ
denied, 747 So. 2d 40 (1999). The third circuit does not consider this to be reformation. It simply

concludes that language from which parishes or municipalities can be identified satisfies the statute. The

first circuit on the other hand, has suggested that this interpretation is inappropriate, especially when the
contract contains no severance or savings clause. See TurnerProfessionalServs., Ltd. v. Broussard, 762
So. 2d 184, 186 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied,770 So. 2d 356 (2000).
279. See Moreno andAssociates, 741 So. 2d at 93.
280. See Henderson Implement, Co., v. Langley, 707 So. 2d 482 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1998).
281. See Moores Pump and Supply, Inc. v. Laneaux, 727 So. 2d 695 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1999);
Moreno and Associates v. Black, 741 So. 2d 91 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writdenied, 745 So. 2d 606 (1999);
Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. v. Untereker, 731 So. 2d 965 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 747 So. 2d 40
(1999); Henderson Implement, Co. v. Langley, 707 So. 2d 482 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1998).
282. See Scariano Brothers, Inc. v. Sullivan, 719 So. 2d 131,135 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writdenied,
727 So. 2d 452 (1998).
283. See Dixie Parking Serv., Inc. v. Hargrove, 691 So. 2d 1316,1320-21 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1997).
284. Id. at 1320, The court stated, "The Louisiana Supreme Court recently applied a severability
clause to strike nonenforceableprovisions of a non-competitive agreemenf Id. (emphasis added).
285. See Newton and Associates, Inc. v. Boss, 772 So. 2d 793 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2000), writ
denied, 2001 WL 50386 (2001). In this case, the defendant-employee argued that the two-year
restriction included the time she worked for the plaintiff. The fifth circuit easily ruled in favor of the
plaintiff, finding the argument irreconcilable with the plain text of La. R.S. 23:921. Id.The pertinent
part of the statute states, "not to exceed a period of two years from termination of employment." La.
R.S. 23:921(C) (Supp. 2001).
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that he knows will be enforced by the court. If the attorney includes a severability or
savings clause, a court has the option to delete provisions and enforce the remainder.
However, certainty has its disadvantages.
1. EncouragesOpportunisticBehavior
Simply requiring technical compliance with Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:291
encourages employers to behave opportunistically. If employers know that
noncompetition agreements will be enforced, they have an incentive to require such
agreements even when they are unnecesary to protect their interests.2" They may
also draft the agreement as broad as possible, knowing .that a court will delete the
provisions that should not apply and enforce the remainder against the employee.
Furthermore, if an employee does not seek legal advice and challenge the validity of
the noncompetition agreement, he will not compete in the stated area. Trade will
thereby be restrained unnecessarily.
2. Exclusively Protectsthe Employer
Requiring mechanical adherence to the statute assumes that the legislature made
prudent policy decisions in enacting the statute. 287 The third circuit appears to have
made such an assumption, considering the fact tht it has upheld every noncompetition
agreement that it has considered post-AMCOM. However, the statute as applied is
weighted more heavily in the employer's favor; indeed, the legislature may not have
adequately addressed the policies it considered in the text of the statute. It may be
more appropriate for a court to look to thepurposeofthe statute which is undoubtedly
to protect the employer's interests. Looking to the reasonableness of each
noncompetition agreement would ensure that the employer's interests were protected
and that the employee's rights were not infringed. The second circuit appears to take
such an approach, finding a way not to enforce noncompetition agreements when the
result seems unjust.
3. ForeclosesBalancingofInterests
By simply requiring mechanical adherence, Louisiana courts fail to consider what
most other jurisdictions consider in determining the enforceability ofnoncompetition
agreements. The Restatement (Second) on Contracts provides that "[a] promise to
refrain from competition... is unreasonably in restraint oftrade if (a) the restraint is
greater than is needed to protect the promisee's legitimate interest, or (b) the
promisee's need is outweighed by the hardship to the promisor and the likely injury

286. SeegenerallyPaul H.Rubin &Peter Shedd, Human Capitaland CovenantsNot to Compete,
10 J.of Legal Stud. 93 (1981).
287. The judiciary should exercise the will of the legislature.
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to the public."2 ' Louisiana's requirement that the employer must carry on a like
business within the specified parishes in order to justify a noncompetition agreement
will not always ensure that the employer has a legitimate business interest that
requires protection. Moreover, a situation might arise in which enforcement would
be entirely unjust, yet the courts have no mechanism to invalidate such agreements
based on 23:921.
4. Failsto Considerthat NoncompetitionAgreements are Unnecessarywith
Some Types ofTraining
The mechanical adherence approach allows employers to enforce noncompetition
agreements even when they are not needed to protect their interests. It has been
argued that noncompetition agreements are unnecessary when an employer provides
certain types of training.289 For example, if an employer provides "specific training,"
the type of training only valuable to the employer providing it, the employer will
provide incentives to keep the employee and recoup his investment because that
employee is more valuable than others in the labor pool.2 Furthermore, there is no
need to limit the post-employment activities of the employee because the training is
of no benefit to other employers.29'
If, however, the training is "general," such that the training is useful to many
employers,292 the need for noncompetition agreements depends on the cost of the
training.293 If the training is the type that can be financed by the employee,294 the
employer will not be willing to pay for the training because he pays a premium for
trained workers. However, the untrained employee will be willing to pay for training
because he knows that he will be able to command a premium from other
employers. 29s The employee will pay for this training by accepting reduced wages
during his training period.2 96 Thus, anoncompetition agreement is not needed because
the employee is bearing the expense of his training rather than the employer.
Noncompetition agreements are -appropriate in a situation where the general
training is so expensive that the employee cannot pay for it by accepting reduced
wages.297 An example of such training is the revelation of trade secrets to the
employee. Because the employer will have to finance this training, and because the
employee will have much incentive to use this training to command a premium wage
from other employers, the employer should be able to prevent the employee from
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 188 (1981).
See Rubin & Shedd, supranote 286, at 93.
Id. at 93-94; citingGary S. Becker, Human Capital (1964)).
Id.
Id. at 93 (citing Gary S. Becker, Human Capital (1964)).
Id.

294.

One type of training that can be financed by the employee includes learning how to operate

machinery.
295. See Rubin & Shedd, supra note 286, at 96.
296. Id.
297. Id.
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However, such information/training may be

protected by other means, such as trade secrets law orby including liquidated damages
provisions in employment contracts.29
VIII.

THE APPROACH OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS

The legislature based Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:921 on statutes enacted in
Although the text of Louisiana's statute is similar, the
Alabama and Florida.2

application and results have differed significantly. In order to evaluate better the
approach taken by Louisiana courts, a brief examination of Florida's and Alabama's
treatment of noncompetition agreements follows.
A. Alabama'sApproach to Noncompetition agreements

1. StatutoryRequirements andInterpretativeCases
Alabama regulates noncompetition agreements in Alabama Code §8 -1-l.3o Its
acceptance ofnoncompetition agreements follows a general prohibition ofany agreement
that restrains people from exercising a lawful profession, trade, or business. 1
The Alabama Supreme Court has established a four-prong test to determine whether
a noncompetition agreement that fits within the statutory exceptions is enforceable."e
The test requires the employer to have a protectable interest, the restriction to be
reasonably related to that interest,the restriction to be reasonable in time and place, and

that the restriction not impose any undue hardship on the employee.

3

The Alabama

Supreme Court has stated that it will uphold noncompetition and nonsolicitation
agreements thatpartiallyrestrain trade so long as they are properly restricted as to time,
territory, and persons and are supported by ample consideration." °

298. These alternate approaches are discussed supra in Parts X.C. I and X.C.2.
299. Morgan, supra note 8,at 552.
300. The statute provides:
Every contract by which anyone is restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade, or
business of any kind otherwise than is provided by this section is to that extent void.
One who sells the good will of a business may agree with the buyer and one who is
employed as an agent, servant, or employee may agree with his employer to refrain from
carrying on or engaging in asimilar business and to prohibit an employee from soliciting old
customers of such employer within a specified county, city or part thereof so long as the
buyer, or any person deriving title to the good will from him, or employer carries on a like
business therein.
Ala. Code §8-1-1(a) (Michie 1993).
301. Id.
302. Ex pane Caribe, U.S.A., Inc., 702 So. 2d 1234 (Ala. 1997), citing James S.Kemper & Co. v.
Cox & Assocs., 434 So. 2d 1380, 1384 (Ala. 1983)).
303. Id.
304. Sevier Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Willis Corroon Corp. of Birmingham, 711 So. 2d 995 (Ala. 1998).
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With respect to the first prong ofthe test, an employer "must possess a 'substantial
right in its business sufficiently unique to warrant the type ofprotection contemplated by
[a] noncompetition agreement.""'3 5 An employer may have a protectable interest "ifthe
employee is in a position to gain confidential information, access to secret lists, or to
develop a close relationship with clients."3 '5 The cases that have addressed this issue
focuses on protecting information that is substantial or unique, as well as established
relationships with clients.3" Simple labor skills of an employee are not considered an
employer's protectable interest and thus cannot be restricted by a noncompetition
30
agreement. 8
The second prong requires the restriction be reasonably related to the employer's
protectable interest.3"5 Since the determination of whether the prong is met is based on
reasonableness, the decision is left up to the factfinder.10
The thirdprong requires any restriction to be reasonable intime and place. Because
the test again is reasonableness, the court decides if the restriction will be upheld. The
restricted area may include all of Alabama or more than Alabama, depending on the
circumstances.31' The time restriction allowed mayvary with the circumstances, and may
be for a period longer thana year.312
The fourthprong, requiring that there tobe no undue hardship on the employee, boils
down to a reasonableness determination. Courts may consider the age of the former
employee, family status, financial obligations, andthe amount oftraining inother fields. 3
Considering that Alabama is a common law state, the fact that the courts have
devised ajudicialtest for determining the enforceability of noncompetition agreements
is not surprising. Because the courts have infused a reasonableness standard with the
statutory allowance of noncompetition agreements, Alabama agreements are less
restrictive on the post-termination activities of an employee than are Louisiana

305. Caribe,702 So. 2d at 1239 (citing Cullman Broadcasting Co. v. Bosley, 373 So. 2d 830, 836
(Ala. 1979)).
306. Malsberger, supranote 132, at 66, citing Sheffield v. Stoudenmire, 553 So. 2d 125, 126 (Ala.
1989)).
307. Id. at 63; Sheffield v. Stoudenmire, 553 So. 2d 125 (Ala. 1989) (information obtained by
employee was not so substantial and unique to warrant the noncompetition agreement); Allied Supply
Co. v. Brown, 585 So. 2d 33 (Ala. 1991) (confidential information sought to be protected through use
of noncompetition agreement); Clark v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 592 So. 2d 564, 566 (Ala. 1992)
(employee had sole contact with policyholders).
308. Malsberger, supranote 132 at 66; (citing Greenlee v. Tuscaloosa Office Prod. & Supply, 474
So. 2d 669 (Ala. 1985)).
309. Ex parte Caribe, U.S.A., Inc., 702 So. 2d 1234 (Ala. 1997) (citing James S. Kenper & Co.
v. Cox & Assocs., 434 So. 2d 1380, 1384 (Ala. 1983)).
310. Id.
311. Malsberger, supranote 132, at 67 (citing Clark v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 592 So. 2d 564,
566 (Ala. 1992)).
312. Clark v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 592 So. 2d 564, 566 (Ala. 1992) (one year was a
reasonable restriction); Sheffield v. Stoudenmire, 553 So. 2d 125 (Ala. 1989) (six months was an
unreasonable restriction); Central Bancshares of the South v. Puckett, 584 So. 2d 829 (Ala. 1991) (two

years was a reasonable restriction).
313. Malsberger, supranote 132, at 68 (citing Clark v. liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 592 So. 2d 564,
566 (Ala. 1992).
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agreements. 14 The fear that noncompetition agreements will be declared null if they are
too restrictive may cause employers to demand only that which is necessary to actually
protect their interests.
2. Reformation
Like Louisiana, Alabama allows its courts toreformnoncompetition agreements that
are overbroad. However, the courts have ruled that only provisions unreasonable as to
time and territory may be reformed.31
3. Professionals
Alabama's statute specifically prohibits agreements restraining people from their
professions," 6 and only those selling goodwill and those in an employment relationship
are exempted in part (b)ofthe statute.3" 7 Professionals are not subject to the exemption
in part (b) ofthe statute, and therefore noncompetition agreements are unenforceable
against them. 1 8 Alabama's Supreme Court has determined that accountants, physicians,
and veterinarians are professionals for purposes ofthe statute. " 9 Alabama has adopted
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and its Rule 5.6 restricts the application of
noncompetition agreements to attorneys. 320
4. Duress
The Alabama Supreme Court has held that the signing of a noncompetition
32
agreement as a condition of continued employment does not constitute duress. ' In
addition, a federal district court has held that an at-will employment relationship does not
mean no consideration existed forthe contract.3' However, courts may consider the fact

that an employment relationship is at-will in determining the reasonableness of the
agreement. 3 3
314. Agreements which have been upheld include a one year restriction on contacting insurance
clients of the former employer and a prohibition ofan ad salesman from working at another television
station within a 60-mile radius for one year. See Clark, 592 So. 2d at 564. Booth v. WPMI Television
Co., 533 So. 2d 209 (Ala. 1988).
315. Malsberger, supra note 132 (citing Mason Corp. v. Kennedy, 244 So. 2d 585 (Ala. 1971)).
316. Ala.Code §8-1-1(a) (Michie 1975).
317. Ala.Code § 8-1-1(b) (Michie 1975).
318. Malsberger, supra note 132, at 60.
319. Id. (citing Cherry, Bekaert & Holland v. Brown, 582 So. 2d 502 (Ala. 1991) (accountant);
Friddle v. Raymond, 575 So. 2d 1038 (Ala. 1991) (veterinarian); Odess v. Taylor, 211 So. 2d 805
(1968)(physician)).
320. Alabama Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.6. (1996).
321. Clark v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 592 So. 2d 564, 567 (Ala. 1992).
322. Malsberger, supra note 132, at 70, citing Affiliated Paper Cos. v. Hughes, 667 F. Supp. 1436
(N.D. Ala. 1987)).
323. Birmingham Television Corp. v. DeRamus, 502 So. 2d 761 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986).
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B. Florida

1. StatutoryAuthorization andInterpretativeCases
Enacted in 1953, Florida Statutes §542.12 served as the model for Louisiana
Revised Statutes 28:92132 The Florida Supreme Court stated in early decisions that
the purpose of the statute was to protect the employer from unfair competition. 25
However, in the 1970s and 1980s the Florida courts adopted a contract-oriented
approach to noncompetition agreements which led to conflicting and unprincipled
decisions.32 While recognizing that the policy of preventing unfair competition
allowed courts to invalidate unreasonable noncompetition agreements, the contractoriented approach did not leave the courts with such an option. Rather, it "provided
no principled way for the courts to decline to enforce contractual restrictions upon
competition that were not justified by the need to protect any substantial 'legitimate
business interest' and.. .lent itself to distortion by result-oriented courts. 327
As a result of the inconsistencies in application, §542.12 was amended in 1990,
and was designated as §542.33.328 However, this statute only introduced more
324. The relevant text of the 1953 statute provided in 1979 that:
(2) One who sells the good will ofa business, or any shareholder of a corporation selling or
otherwise disposing of all of his shares in said corporation, may agree with the buyer, and
one who is employed as an agent or employee may agree with his employer, to refrain from
carrying on or engaging in a similar business and from soliciting old customers of such
employer within a reasonably limited time and area, so long as the buyer or any person
deriving title to the good will from him, and so long as such employer continues to carry on
a like business therein. Said agreements may, in the discretion of a court of competent
jurisdiction be enforced by injunction.
Fla. Stat. Ann. §542.12 (1979).
325. John A. Grant, Jr. and Thomas T. Steele, Restrictive Covenants: Florida Returns to the
Original "Unfair Competition" Approach for the 21st Century, 70 Fla. B.J. 53 (1996), (citing Miller
Mechanical, Inc. v. Ruth, 300 So. 2d 11, 12 (Fla. 1974)).
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id. The statute as amended in 1990 provided the following:
(1) Notwithstanding other provisions of this chapter to the contrary, each contract by which
any person is restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade, or business ofany kind,
as provided by subsections (2) and (3) hereof, is to that extent valid, and all other contracts
in restraint of trade are void.
(2)(a) One who sells the goodwill of a business, or any shareholder of a corporation selling
or otherwise disposing of all of her or his shares in said corporation, may agree with the
buyer, and one who is employed as an agent, independent contractor, or employee may agree
with her or his employer, to refrain from carrying on or engaging in a similar business and
from soliciting old customers of such employer within a reasonably limited time and area,.
so long as the buyer or any person deriving title to the goodwill from her or him, and so long
as such employer, continues to carry on a like business therein. Said agreements may, in the
discretion ofa court ofcompetentjurisdiction, be enforced by injunction. However, the court
shall not enter an injunction contrary to the public health, safety, or welfare or in any case
where the injunction enforces an unreasonable covenant not to compete or where there is no
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ambiguities because it created the standardless defenses of "unreasonableness" and
being "contrary to the public health, safety, or welfare," and further required
irreparable injury for an agreement to be enforced, while specifying narrow instances
when irreparable injury would occur. 29 Because the statute did not offer sufficient
guidance to the courts, the Florida courts again split on its application and created
even more uncertainty as to whether noncompetition agreements would be
enforced.33°
33
The legislature therefore amended the statute again in 1996. ' The new statute
332
is thorough and reverts to an unfair competition approach. It includes illustrations
and presumptions for the courts to apply. 33 It also requires that an employer prove
334
a legitimate business interest in order to justify the restrictive covenant, and the
interest. 33
business
legitimate
covenant must be reasonably necessary to protect that
336
The court may not consider the economic hardships of the employee, but must
337
A court may reform an overbroad
consider any other legal or equitable defenses.
338
agreement so that it reasonably protects the legitimate business interests.
Florida cases support the idea that the legislature's latest amendment of §542.335
is a "balanced statute that does not unnecessarily impede competition, the ability of
competitors to hire experienced workers, or the efforts of employees to secure better

showing of irreparable injury. However, use ofspecific trade secrets, customer lists, or direct
solicitation of existing customers shall be presumed to be an irreparable injury and may be
specifically enjoined. In the event the seller of the goodwill of a business, or a shareholder

selling or otherwise disposing ofall her or his shares in acorporation breaches an agreement
torefrain from carryingon orengagingin asimilar business, irreparable injuryshall be presumed.
(b)The licensee, or any person deriving title from the licensee, of the use of atrademark or
service mark, and the business format or system identified by that trademark or service mark,
may agree with the licensor to refrain from carrying on or engaging in asimilar business and
from soliciting old customers of such licensor within areasonably limited time and area, so
long as the licensor, or any person deriving title from the licensor, continues to carry on a
like business therein. Said agreements may, in the discretion of a court of competent
jurisdiction, be enforced by injunction.
(3)Partners may, upon or in anticipation of adissolution ofthe partnership, agree that all or
some of them will not carry on asimilar business within a reasonably limited time and area.
(4) This section does not apply to any litigation which may be pending, or to any cause of
action which may have accrued, prior to May 27, 1953.
Fla. Stat. Ann. §542.33 (1997).
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Fla. Stat. Ann. §542.335 (1997). Valid restraints oftrade or commerce. For the full text of
the statute, see Appendix A.
332. Gant & Steele, supra note 328, at 56.
333. See, e.g. Fla. Stat. Ann. §542.335(1)(b)(1-5), §542.335(l)(b)(4)(a-c), §542.335(l)(c) (1997).
334. Fla. Stat. Ann. §542.335(1)(b) (1997).
335. Fla. Stat. Ann. §542.335(t)(c) (1997).
336. Fla. Stat. Ann. §542.335(l)(g)(1) (1997).
337. Fla. Stat. Ann. §542.335(l)(gX3) (1997). Must acourt thus reconsider lack ofconsideration
in at-will employment?
338. Fla. Stat. Ann. §542.335(l)(c)(1997).
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paying positions." '39 For example, in Anich Industries,Inc. v. Raney,340 the fifth
district court of appeal refused to enjoin an employee, who had worked for her
former employer for only three months, from working for a competitor after
termination. 4' The court found that the employer had no legitimate business interest
in enjoining the defendant from working for the competitor, as she received little
training, learned no trade secrets, and did not develop substantial relationships with
any clients. 42 In another case, the fourth district court of appeal refused to enforce
a noncompetition agreement because the plaintiff had breached the employment
contract, and therefore could not enforce the noncompetition agreement.343 The third
circuit court of appeal did uphold an agreement where the plaintiff had provided the
defendant with more than 195 hours of training, resulting in him receiving FAA
certification to repair heat exchangers." Other cases enforced agreements after
reforming them to what would be reasonably necessary to protect the employer's
business interests. 45
2. Reformation
Section 542.335 specifically permits a court to reform an overly broad provision
such that it will allow the relief reasonably necessary to protect the employer's
legitimate business interest.3 46 This provision affirms prior Florida decisions that had
authorized application of the "blue pencil doctrine. 347
3. Professionals
Section 542.335 does not restrict its application to professionals. No decisions
subsequent to the 1996 amendment have decided whether covenants not to compete
may be enforced against professionals. However, in Benemerito & Flores v.

339. Grant & Steele, supra note 328, at 55.
340. Anich Industries, Inc. v. Raney, 751 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
341. Id.
342. Id.at 769-70. The court did not find any substantialrelationship because theplaintiff's clients
were not exclusive. Rather, they bought supplies from multiple sources based on price and availability.
Id. at 770.
343. Benemerito & Flores v. Roche, 751 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999). The court
considered breach of contract as a legal defense.
344. Aero Kool Corp. v. Oosthuizen, 736 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
345. Flickenger v. Fitzgerald & Co., Inc. 732 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (reducing
three year restriction to two years because three years was presumptively unreasonable and plaintiff
presented no evidence to rebut that presumption); Austin v. Mid State Fire Equip., Inc., 727 So. 2d 1097
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (enforcing agreement with respect to nondisclosure of customer lists and
prices, while striking the provision seeking to prohibit working for the competitor; working for the
competitor would not cause harm if the employee does not approach customers or divulge pricing
information).
346. Fla. Stat. Ann. §542.335(1)(c) (1997).
347. Grant & Steele, supra note 328, at 55 (citing Flammer v. Patton, 245 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 1971);
Santana Products Co. v. Von Korff, 573 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 2d. Dist. Ct. 1991)).
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Roche,348 the court of appeal may have enforced the covenant had the
plaintiff/employer not breached its employment contract with the
defendant/employee.349
4. Duress/At-Will Employment
Continued employment is deemed sufficient consideration for entering into a
restrictive covenant, both before the statutory amendment and after. °
IX. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

Although no solution is likely to resolve .all problems surrounding
noncompetition clauses, some suggestions are presented in this section that could, if
implemented, ameliorate the problems with Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:92 1.
A. JudicialActivism
Until the Louisiana legislature amends Revised Statutes 23:921, the Louisiana
Supreme Court could resolve some problems by looking to the purpose ofthe statute
and require agreements to be reasonable, much like the Alabama Supreme Court has
done. Enabling lower courts to consider the reasonableness of noncompetition
agreements would ensure that employers are not able to restrain the activities of its
former employers beyond that which is necessary to protect his interests.
Although the second circuit has interpreted Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:921
narrowly and therefore enforces noncompetition agreements against fewer types of
employees,"' this approach does not ensure adequate protection for employers. A
situation could arise when an employee who has not opened his own competing
business and is not soliciting customers misappropriates something that his former
employer provided him. For example, if an employer financed the employee's
general training and the employee quit before the employer could recoup his
investment, the former employer would have no remedy unless the employee opened
a competing business or solicited former customers. More suitable judicial activism
would be to apply a reasonableness test to every noncompetition agreement, thereby
ensuring enforcement or invalidation where appropriate.

348. Benemerito & Flores v. Roche, 751 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
349. The court did not mention any policies against enforcing restrictive covenants against
professionals.
350. Balasco v. Gulf Auto Holding, Inc., 707 So. 2d 858, 860 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Coastal
Unilube, Inc. v. Smith, 598 So. 2d 200 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
351. The second circuit only enforces noncompetition agreements against employees who open
their own competing businesses or against employees who solicit customers of their former employers.
See Summit Inst. for Pulmonary Med. and Rehabilitation, Inc. v. Prouty, 691 So. 2d 1384 (La. App. 2d
Cir.), writ denied,701 So. 2d 983 (1997); see also discussion in supraPart VI.A.
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B. Rewrite the Statute
Considering that Louisiana's noncompetition stitute was based, in part, on the
Florida statute which failed and has been amended twice, Louisiana should strongly
consider revamping its own statute. Moreover, the fact that Alabama courts have
applied a reasonableness test to the statute undermines the "mechanical adherence"
approach taken by Louisiana courts. Not only have Louisiana courts been unable to
deal with the issues surrounding noncompetition agreements consistently, but the
statute allows employers to prohibit more than any other typical jurisdiction."'
Florida's latest enactment regarding noncompetition agreements appears to
encompass all important issues. It manages to protect an employer's investment in
an employee while restricting the employee only to the degree necessary to protect
that investment. Therefore, it restrains trade as little as is necessary to prevent others
from gaining unfair advantages. Although it might be argued that such a statute does
not provide any certainty at the time of the signing of the agreement and will therefore
increase litigation, if an agreement is reasonable and minimally restrictive, the
employee will be more likely to comply and thereby avoid litigation. Moreover, if the
agreement appears to be too intrusive considering the qualities of the employment
relationship, the employer will not seek to enforce it, again avoiding the costs of
litigation.
C. Rarely Use NoncompetitionAgreements in Louisiana
As argued by Paul H. Rubin and Peter Shedd in their article, Human Capitaland
CovenantsNot to Compete,noncompetition agreements are unnecessary, except when
an employer provides training that cannot be financed by employers, such as trade
secrets.353 However, even trade secrets can be protected by the Louisiana Uniform
Trade Secret Act. Even if an employer pays for general training, he may ensure that
he recoups his investment byproviding a liquidated damages clause in the employee's
employment contract.
D. Protectthe Employer's Interests Using OtherAreas ofLaw
The Louisiana Uniform Trade Secret Act (UTSA)354 may be used to protect
information like customer lists in some circumstances. A customer list may be
considered a trade secret if efforts are made to maintain its secrecy. 55 If a customer
list is valuable, the owner/employer will undoubtedly take steps to maintain its
secrecy. Furthermore, a former employee has a fiduciary duty not to use or
communicate information given to him in confidence to compete with his former
352. Cf La. R.S. 23:921 (Supp 2001).
353. Rubin & Shedd, supra note 289.
354. La. R.S. 51:1431-39(1987).
355. Pontchartrain Medical Labs, Inc. v. Roche Biomedical Labs.., 677 So. 2d 1086, 1090 (La.
App. I st Cir. 1996), (citing Wyatt v. P02, Inc., 651 So. 2d 359 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writdenied, 654 So.
2d 331 (1995)).
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employer unless the information given is a matter of general knowledge.3 16 If an
employee misappropriates the confidential information by using or disclosing the
trade secret without the consent of his former employer, 3" he will be liable to his
former employer for the actual loss caused by the misappropriation and the amount
by which he has been unjustly enriched.358 It should be noted that the use of
information retained by memory does not constitute a violation of the act;359 thus,
UTSA will not protect all of an employer's confidential information. If an
employee will have the occasion to memorize sensitive information that an
employer wishes to protect, a noncompetition agreement would then be appropriate.
E. Use LiquidatedDamagesProvisionsin Every Employment Contract

There is no reason why employers cannot include liquidated damages
provisions contracts in their employment contracts. 3" Training financed by the
employer has a determined value, and an employer knows the length oftime needed
to recoup his investment. An employer could set forth a term of employment that
coincides with the time necessary to recoup the training investment, and if the
employee should quit prior to the expiration of the term, he would be required to
pay an amount in liquidated damages.
Liquidated damages provisions would simplify the termination ofemployment
for both employers and employees. Employees would have a monetary incentive
to remain employed by the employer who provided and financed training.
Moreover, if an employee wished to work elsewhere, he would be able to tell his
new employer how much it was going to cost to leave his current job; the new
employer could then decide whether the employee is worth that amount. If an
employee chooses to quit, the employer would recover the amount of money
expended on that employee for training, either from the employee himself, or more
likely from the new employer. Litigation might be drastically decreased, and the
only issue perhaps warranting the court's review is the reasonableness of the
liquidated damages provision." '

356. NCH Corp. v. Broyles, 749 F.2d 247, 254 (5th Cir. 1985). This duty results from the
principal-agent relationship between the employer and the employee. Id.
357. La. R.S. 51:1431(2)(b)(1997).
358. La. R.S. 51:1433 (1997).
359. See NCH Corp., 749 F.2d at 254.
360. Liquidated damages provisions are specifically authorized by Louisiana Civil Code Article
2005, which states in part: "Parties may stipulate the damages to be recovered incase ofnonperformance
defective performance, or delay in performance ofan obligation."
361. Liquidated damages provisions should reasonably approximate the expected loss and should
not be penal. American Leasing Co. of Monroe, Inc. v. Lannon E.Miller & Son, General Contracting,
Inc., 469 So. 2d 325 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985). However, because actual damages are not aprerequisite
to recovery, acourt must determine whether the provision isreasonable by inquiring whether the parties
truly attempted to reasonably approximate actual damages. La. Civ. Code art. 2009; American Leasing,
469 So. 2d 328-29.
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X. CONCLUSION

Noncompetition agreements should not be used in as many circumstances as
they currently are. In fact, there is rarely a need for them to ever apply. However,
while Louisiana courts continue to enforce noncompetition agreements in favor of
employers without respect to the reasonableness of such provisions, employers will
undoubtedly continue to require their employees to sign them. Employers simply
have to include severability clauses and structure the agreements correctly, and the
agreement will be enforced.
Conversely, employees have little power. Rarely do employees seek the advice
of legal counsel prior to signing a noncompetition agreement, and rarely do they
consider that one will actually be enforced against them ifit is unfair. In addition,
employees usually lack the bargaining power at the time they enter into
noncompetition agreements to negotiate something different. Furthermore,
Louisiana courts have no mechanism to invalidate unfair agreements if they comply
with the statute.
Louisiana courts and the Louisiana legislature should strongly consider
adopting an approach that will truly protect the interests of employers while
balancing the rights of employees to seek employment elsewhere.
Carey C. Lyon*

* The author thanks Professor William Corbett for his thoughtful advice and generous assistance
in the writing of this article, for always being willing to read and comment on another draft at a
moment's notice, and for encouraging the author to accept a position as a Junior Associate of the
Louisiana Law Review.

Appendix A

Florida Statute §542.335. Valid restraints of trade or commerce
(1) Notwithstanding s. 542.18 and subsection (2), enforcement of contracts that
restrict or prohibit competition during or after the term ofrestrictive covenants, so
long as such contracts are reasonable in time, area, and line of business, is not
prohibited. In any action concerning enforcement of a restrictive covenant:
(a) A court shall not enforce a restrictive covenant unless it is set forth in a
writing signed by the person against whom enforcement is sought.
(b) The person seeking enforcement of a restrictive covenant shall plead and
prove the existence ofone or more legitimate business interests justifying the
restrictive covenant. The term "legitimate business interest" includes, but is not
limited to:
1. Trade secrets, as defined in s. 688.002(4).
2. Valuable confidential business or professional information that otherwise
does not qualify as trade secrets.
3. Substantial relationships with specific prospective or existing customers,
patients, or clients.
4. Customer, patient, or client goodwill associated with:
a. An ongoing business or professional practice, by way of trade name,
trademark, service mark, or "trade dress";
b. A specific geographic location; or
c. A specific marketing or trade area.
5. Extraordinary or specialized training.
Any restrictive covenant not supported by a legitimate business interest is unlawful
and is void and unenforceable.
(c) A person seeking enforcement ofa restrictive covenant also shall plead and
prove that the contractually specified restraint is reasonably necessary to protect
the legitimate business interest or interests justifying the restriction. If a person
seeking enforcement of the restrictive covenant establishes prima facie that the
restraint is reasonably necessary, the person opposing enforcement has the'burden
of establishing that the contractually specified restraint is overbroad, overlong, or
otherwise not reasonably necessary to protect the established legitimate business
interest or interests. If a contractually specified restraint is overbroad, overlong, or
otherwise not reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate business interest or
interests, a court shall modify the restraint and grant only the relief reasonably
necessary to protect such interest or interests.
(d) In determining the reasonableness in time of a postterm restrictive covenant
not predicated upon the protection of trade secrets, a court shall apply the
following rebuttable presumptions: 1. In the case of a restrictive covenant sought to
be enforced against a former employee, agent, or independent contractor, and not
associated with the sale of all or a part of:
a. The assets ofa business or professional practice, or
b. The shares of a corporation, or
c. A partnership interest, or
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d. A limited liability company membership, or
e. An equity interest, of any other type, in a business or professional practice,
a court shall presume reasonable in time any restraint 6 months or less in duration
and shall presume unreasonable in time any restraint more than 2 years in duration.
2. In the case of a restrictive covenant sought to be enforced against a former
distributor, dealer, franchisee, or licensee of a trademark or service mark and not
associated with the sale of all or a part of:
a. The assets of a business or professional practice, or
b. The shares ofa corporation, or
c. A partnership interest, or
d. A limited liability company membership, or
e. An equity interest, ofany other type, in a business or professional practice,
a court shall presume reasonable in time any restraint 1year or less in duration and
shall presume unreasonable in time any restraint more than 3 years in duration.
3. In the case of a restrictive covenant sought to be enforced against the seller of
all or a part of:
a. The assets of a business or professional practice, or
b. The shares of a corporation, or
c. A partnership interest, or
d. A limited liability company membership, or
e. An equity interest,of any other type, in a business or professional practice,a
court shall presume reasonable in time any restraint 3 years or less in duration and
shall presume unreasonable in time any restraint more than 7 years in duration.
(e) In determining the reasonableness in time of a postterm restrictive covenant
predicated upon the protection of trade secrets, a court shall presume reasonable in
time any restraint of 5 years or less and shall presume unreasonable in time any
restraint ofmore than 10 years. All such presumptions shall be rebuttable
presumptions.
(f) The court shall not refuse enforcement of a restrictive covenant on the ground
that the person seeking enforcement is a third-party beneficiary of such contract or
is an assignee or successor to a party to such contract, provided:
1. In the case ofa third-party beneficiary, the restrictive covenant expressly
identified the person as a third-party beneficiary of the contract and expressly
stated that the restrictive covenant was intended for the benefit of such person.
2. In the case of an assignee or successor, the restrictive covenant expressly
authorized enforcement by a party's assignee or successor.
(g) In determining the enforceability of a restrictive covenant, a court:
1. Shall not consider any individualized economic or other hardship that might be
caused to the person against whom enforcement is sought.
2. May consider as a defense the fact that the person seeking enforcement no
longer continues in business in the area or line ofbusiness that is the subject of the
action to enforce the restrictive covenant only if such discontinuance ofbusiness is
not the result ofa violation of the restriction.
3. Shall consider all other pertinent legal and equitable defenses.
4. Shall consider the effect of enforcement upon the public health, safety, and
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welfare.
(h) A court shall construe a restrictive covenant in favor ofproviding reasonable
protection to all legitimate business interests established by the person seeking
enforcement. A court shall not employ any rule of contract construction that
requires the court to construe a restrictive covenant narrowly, against the restraint,
or against the drafter of the contract.
(i) No court may refuse enforcement of an otherwise enforceable restrictive
covenant on the ground that the contract violates public policy unless such public
policy is articulated specifically by the court and the court finds that the specified
public policy requirements substantially outweigh the need to protect the legitimate
business interest or interests established by the person seeking enforcement of the
restraint.
0) A court shall enforce a restrictive covenant by any appropriate and effective
remedy, including, but not limited to, temporary and permanent injunctions. The
violation of an enforceable restrictive covenant creates a presumption of
irreparable injury to the person seeking enforcement of a restrictive covenant. No
temporary injunction shall be entered unless the person seeking enforcement of a
restrictive covenant gives a proper bond, and the court shall not enforce any
contractual provision waiving the requirement of an injunction bond or limiting the
amount ofsuch bond.
(k) In the absence of a contractual provision authorizing an award of attorney's
fees and costs to the prevailing party, a court may award attorney's fees and costs
to the prevailing party in any action seeking enforcement of,or challenging the
enforceability of, a restrictive covenant. A court shall not enforce any contractual
provision limiting the court's authority under this section.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed or interpreted to legalize or make
enforceable any restraint of trade or commerce otherwise illegal or unenforceable
under the laws ofthe United States or of this state.
(3) This act shall apply prospectively, and it shall not apply in actions
determining the enforceability ofrestrictive covenants entered into before July 1,
1996.

